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Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate
Counsel:
Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?
Peter J. Henningt

INTRODUCTION

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act' was a reaction to spectacular
corporate failures that were traceable to fraudulent
accounting mixed with naked greed. Statutes enacted as a
reaction to unfolding events are rarely well-conceived, and
like many laws adopted in response to discrete events, the
Act reflects almost a "shoot-first-ask-questions-later"
approach that allowed for quick political gain. Has the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act curbed corporate crime? Although it is
too early to tell, at least initially the law has added
significant costs to the operation of virtually every publicly
traded corporation and created an extensive cottage
industry of consultants and law firm practice groups
offering to guide companies in complying with the statute.
Since its adoption in July 2002, more corporate
misconduct has come to light. In March 2003, HealthSouth
Corporation fell prey to many of the same accounting
problems that led to the demise of Enron and WorldCom.
The company's former CEO, Richard Scrushy, was the first
person charged with violating the certification provisions of
the Act.2 In December 2003, Parmalat SpA, a large Italian
conglomerate, fell quickly into bankruptcy after the
revelation that a purported $4.8 billion bank account in a

t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
2. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Chad Terhune, Scrushy Indicted on Fraud
Charges, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3 ("Mr. Scrushy, 51 years old, is the first
chief executive at a major company to be charged with violating Sarbanes-Oxley
since it was enacted last year in the aftermath of investor outrage at a wave of
corporate scandals.").
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Cayman Island bank was, with the help of a scanner and
color printer, little more than a figment of senior
management's imagination.'
While many provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
address the minutiae of reforming corporate boards and
auditing at publicly traded companies, one provision
addressed specifically to lawyers is largely aspirational:
section 307.1 That provision requires the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the "Commission") to
adopt rules "requiring an attorney to report evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive
officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof)." Added
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a floor amendment by the
Senate, § 307 was designed to enlist lawyers in the cause of
preventing corporate crime. Senator Jon Corzine argued in
support of adding the provision that "we cannot overlook
the role corporate lawyers,
the lowest common
denominator, can play in addressing abuses and ensuring
that our markets have integrity."'
The SEC took up the cause of enlisting lawyers in the
battle against corporate crime by proposing rules to
implement § 307 that went beyond the limited requirement
of attorney reporting within the corporation. In addition to
the requisite "up-the-ladder" reporting procedure,6 the
Commission proposed a "noisy withdrawal" rule that would
compel corporate counsel to withdraw from representing
3. See Alessandra Galloni, Scandal at Parmalat Broadens; Staff May Have
Destroyed Files, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 2003, at Al ("Prosecutors believe the
fraudulent Bank of America response [confirming a $4.8 billion account balance]
was created in Parmalat's main offices in Collecchio by scanning Bank of
America's logo into a computer, printing it out and then passing the sheet of
paper several times through a fax machine to make it look authentic").
4. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
5. 148 Cong. Rec. S6556 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine)
(emphasis added). Senator Enzi stated along similar lines, "It seemed only right
there ought to be some kind of an ethical standard put in place for the attorneys
as well. All of the people who are involved should be looking at a new way of
doing business." Id. at S6554 (statement of Sen. Enzi).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
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the corporate client if the company's management did not
respond appropriately to the lawyer's report of possible
misconduct. The proposed rule would enjoin the attorney
to "withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer" and
"give written notice to the Commission of the attorney's
withdrawal, indicating that the withdrawal was based on
professional considerations ...."17
The response from the organized bar to the "noisy
withdrawal" proposal was swift and vituperative.
References to the hoary role of lawyers as protectors of the
innocent and the last bastion of independence from the allpowerful state were brought out to assail the Commission's
proposal. An oft-repeated criticism of the proposed rule
was the purported unseemliness of the government's
attempt to enlist counsel as an agent working against the
interests of the lawyer's client-another "cop on the beat."
In response to such persistent criticism, the SEC shelved
the "noisy withdrawal" rule to study the issue further.
The idea of having corporate counsel disclose the
reasons for withdrawing from representation triggered
such a strong reaction because of the perceived invasion of
the confidential relationship between a lawyer and client.
The audience for that report-the SEC and the investing
public-would interpret any disclosure
of lawyer
withdrawal as significant, and potentially catastrophic, for
the corporation's future. The pressure on the corporation
and its former lawyer to disclose otherwise confidential
communications would be enormous, raising significant
concerns about the lawyer-client relationship. It is not
hard to see why the reaction to the "noisy" aspect of the
proposed rule was so strong, and why rhetoric asserting a
threat to the oldest of the legal privileges resonated.
The flaw in the SEC's proposed rule was that it
coupled "noisy" with "withdrawal."
Lawyers are not
"gatekeepers" in the same way accountants have a duty to

7. Proposed rule § 205.3(d), Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 33-8150 & 34-46868 (Nov. 21,
2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71705-06 (Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Noisy Withdrawal
Rule].
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the investing public to ensure that a company conveys
accurate information. Compelling disclosure to the public
of a lawyer's withdrawal from representation imparts a
gatekeeper role that can create more confusion in the
market than clarity. The noise is largely superfluous to the
goal of preventing corporate crime, while withdrawal is an
important step toward removing lawyers from the process
that can lead to criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the
Commission missed its chance to fulfill the congressional
mandate of § 307 and take an important step in preventing
future corporate crimes when it failed to require attorneys
to withdraw from representation if a client persists in
misconduct.
Lawyers are often critical to the operation of the
corporation, and one would be hard-pressed to find a
significant business decision that did not involve some
consultation with legal counsel. It is this continuing role as
an advisor to the corporation that can give lawyers
leverage to stop corporate wrongdoing if they-and their
firms-are required to withdraw from representation once
the company (and its officers) disregard proper legal advice
and either continue to engage in misconduct or refuse to
rectify the effects of illegal acts. Withdrawal can be a
potent tool because it signals the corporation and other
lawyers that they must tread carefully.
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressed some of the
problems that led to the wide-scale corporate frauds
practiced by Enron and the like, § 307 was one of the few
provisions of the law designed to prevent, or at least
mitigate the effect of, the next round of misconduct by
corporations and their senior management. To carry out
this goal, I argue that the SEC should mandate that a
lawyer withdraw from all representation of the corporation
if the lawyer determines that senior management or the
board of directors is not responding appropriately to the upthe-ladder report of significant wrongdoing by the
corporation and its officers. The importance of complete
withdrawal is the signal it sends to the company's
managers and, perhaps more importantly, to the next
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lawyer (and law firm) hired to represent the company,
because that first lawyer most likely will have to be
replaced and the reasons for withdrawal investigated.
The SEC's "noisy withdrawal" rule requires the
corporation to disclose the reasons for the first attorney's
withdrawal, and that is a key component to making
withdrawal effective as a means to prevent corporate
crime. Any time a client seeks new counsel to replace its
previous lawyer should be a warning to the new lawyer to
tread carefully by, at a minimum, ascertaining why the
first lawyer withdrew. In representation of a corporate
client, the new attorney should consult with the first
lawyer to ensure that the corporate client is acting
appropriately in relation to the subject of the
representation. The disclosure required of the company
must include the first lawyer's reasons for withdrawing,
even if the corporation disagrees with him, so that new
counsel has complete information before undertaking the
representation. s
There are at least two potentially significant problems
with mandating lawyer withdrawal. First, the rule may
create a "race to the bottom" by encouraging corporations to
hire weak lawyers, either initially or after the first lawyer
withdraws.
There is some merit to this argument,
especially in light of the decline in the means to police the
conduct of lawyers through malpractice actions and
securities fraud litigation. Yet, there is always the risk
that a lawyer will accommodate a client's wishes regardless
of the propriety of the request. If a corporation wishes to
maintain a reputation for integrity, and, just as
importantly, if the lawyer is concerned about his or her
standing as an ethical professional, then the likelihood of

8. The SEC's "noisy withdrawal" rule does not deal directly with a
corporation that refuses to disclose to the new lawyer the reasons why its prior
counsel withdrew. If a company refused to make that disclosure, and if it were to
invoke the requirement of client confidentiality to prevent the first lawyer from
speaking to the second lawyer, then that second lawyer should not be permitted
to represent the company. A corporation should not be permitted to flaunt the
rule and still benefit from legal counsel.
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brazen lawyer-shopping will be lessened, although not
eliminated. One can take some comfort in the fact that it is
unlikely a group of lawyers will advertise themselves as the
"Counsel of Last Resort," but I certainly do not exclude the
possibility.
Second, a mandatory withdrawal rule may create a
"race to the top" in the sense that a lawyer, especially inhouse counsel, can use the withdrawal requirement
strategically to force the corporation to accede to the
lawyer's demand, i.e., blackmail. That lawyers may act
strategically is not far-fetched, and this is certainly a
possibility
under a mandatory
withdrawal
rule.
Eliminating the "noisy" element of the rule lessens the
efficacy of blackmail, and to the extent it remains a
possibility, it is like many ethical rules that could be used
by a lawyer to the disadvantage of the client.9
The
requirement
of
complete
withdrawal
from
all
representation of the corporate client further limits the
possibility of blackmail. For outside counsel, withdrawal
may include a number of different matters involving the
firm, while for the in-house lawyer it would necessitate
resignation. The financial impact of mandatory complete
withdrawal should limit use of the rule as a means to
advance the lawyer's personal interests at the expense of
the corporate client.
Can lawyers prevent corporate crime? Lawyers were
not the cause of the misconduct at Enron and the like, and
it is questionable whether counsel could have prevented the
crimes that occurred.
The financial shenanigans at
Parmalat apparently involve the company's long-time
outside counsel, Gian Paolo Zini, as one of the architects of
the fictitious transactions. 10 Section 307 will not ensure
that a lawyer can--or will-stop corporate misconduct,

9. For example, the client confidentiality rule permits a lawyer to reveal
confidences in a fee dispute, and a threat to reveal damaging information could be
used to prevent a client from disputing a bill.
10. See Parmalat Prosecutors Examine Money Transfers in Tax Havens, Wall
St. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at Al (discussing the role of Parmalat officers and Mr. Zini
in setting up corporate shells and transferring funds).
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much less refuse to participate in it, any more than the
ethical prohibition on misleading the court and opposing
counsel does not prevent the destruction of evidence or
A mandatory complete
obstructing an investigation. 1
withdrawal rule, however, can give corporate counsel
leverage to make it much more difficult for corporate
managers to engage in wrongdoing by raising the cost to
the corporation of retaining new counsel, and by signaling
the possibility of misconduct to potential successors.
The corporate crimes that occurred at Enron and
Parmalat are not common events like petty thefts and
domestic violence, which occur every day. The effect of
corporate crime is significant because of the scale of the
enterprise, which can involve thousands of employees,
millions (even billions) of dollars of capital, and investors
from every walk of life. Unlike street crimes, lawyers are
there from the beginning of corporate crimes, and so they
should be enlisted in the effort to prevent it from
happening. A mandatory complete withdrawal rule does
not threaten the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship, and it is unlikely a corporation would simply
forego legal counsel to avoid the possibility that its lawyer
will withdraw at some later point. If mandatory complete
withdrawal means some managers pursuing a high-riskand potentially illegal--course of conduct will be more
likely to avoid seeking the advice of counsel because of this
rule, then all the better-maybe they will not do as good a
job committing the crime and will be caught before causing
significant harm to investors and the public.

11. The SEC recently entered into a settlement with Banc of America
Securities LLC ("BAS") in which the company and its former outside counsel
.continued to provide the [SEC Enforcement Division] staff with inaccurate
information concerning the availability of documents and the status of BAS's
production." In the Matter of Banc of America Securities LLC, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 49386 (March 10, 2004). BAS agreed to pay a civil
penalty of $10 million. One would hope its former outside counsel, who is
unnamed in the administrative action, will be the subject of a similar disciplinary
proceeding.
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I. RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL

Consider the following discussion about the role of a
corporation's lawyers in misconduct perpetrated by officers
and directors:
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era
which has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of
its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the
failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old
as holy writ, that "a man cannot serve two masters" ....
Yet those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved, by
clever legal devices, from the obligation to protect those
whose interests they purport to represent, corporate officers
and directors who award to themselves huge bonuses from
corporate funds without the assent or even the knowledge of
their stockholders ... financial institutions which, in the
infinite variety of their operations, consider only last, if at
all, the interests of those whose funds they command,
suggest how far we have ignored the necessary implications
of that principle.
The loss and suffering inflicted on
individuals, the harm done to a social order founded upon
business and dependent upon its integrity, are incalculable.
There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that
it must bear some burden of responsibility for these evils.
But when we know and face the facts we shall have to
acknowledge that such departures from the fiduciary
principle do not usually occur without the active assistance
of some member of our profession .... 12
One might read these words and assume the speaker
described the sorry state of affairs after the demise of
Enron and WorldCom, the revelation of insider dealings at
Tyco and Adelphia, or perhaps even the chicanery that
caused the downfall of Parmalat. In fact, the speaker was
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone when he gave the keynote
address at the dedication of the Law Quadrangle at the

12. Harlan Fiske Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 89 (1934) (emphasis added).
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University of Michigan in June 1934.
The financial
calamity of which he spoke involved the financial
deceptions leading up to the Great Crash in October 1929,
conduct which in turn sparked the extensive federal
regulation of the securities markets through the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The future Chief Justice's lament seventy years ago
about the role of lawyers in the corporate misdeeds of his
day was echoed by Judge Stanley Sporkin in 1990, in a case
involving, inter alia, the fraudulent sale of notes to
investors through Lincoln Savings & Loan, which was
controlled by Charles Keating. In considering the role of
the professionals advising Lincoln Savings in a course of
conduct that involved questionable, if not deceptive,
disclosures to regulators, the judge stated:
Keating testified that he was so bent on doing the "right
thing" that he surrounded himself with literally scores of
accountants and lawyers to make sure all the transactions
were legal. The questions that must be asked are: Where
were these professionals, a number of whom are now
asserting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when
these clearly
improper
transactions
were
being
consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or
disassociate themselves from the transactions? Where also
were the outside accountants and attorneys when these
transactions were effectuated?
What is difficult to
understand is that with all the professional talent involved
(both accounting and legal), why at least one professional
would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching
that took place in this case.13
Rather, than answer the question, lawyers remained
largely above the fray, refusing to reconsider the role of
counsel to corporations by fighting efforts to impose
requirements to monitor the conduct of corporate clients. 4
13. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C.
1990).
14. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor
After Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (2003) ("After every wave of business
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Lawyers
relied on the traditional
principles
of
independence-that a lawyer is not responsible for the
misdeeds of a client-and confidentiality-that the
relationship of a lawyer and client necessitates the strictest
possible adherence to the protection of attorney-client
communications regardless of the nature of the client-to
resist any effort to impose an obligation on counsel to stop
or at least report the misconduct of a corporate client.15
Efforts to regulate the conduct of corporate counsel
present at, and who participate in, securities fraud by the
corporation did not originate in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
On three occasions, the SEC sought to hold corporate
counsel responsible for the misdeeds of a client that took
place in full view of the lawyers and, indeed, implicated
them in the securities violations. In SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., 6 the SEC brought an injunctive
action against the law firm advising a company involved in
a merger. The Commission established that the law firm
was aware of information related to the company that
should have been disclosed prior to the vote on the
transaction, but failed to do anything to delay the closing of
the deal or to insist that the company make the requisite
disclosure. The district court found that the counsel's
"silence was not only a breach of this duty to speak, but in
addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the closing." 7
Nevertheless, the court refused to issue an injunction
failures resulting from corporate fraud, pressures mount to revise the rules to
make lawyers and accountants better monitors-or at least less amiably
cooperative enablers--of managers' misconduct. The lawyers and accountants
sometimes lose a point or two, but their professional organizations and lobbies
usually succeed in thwarting the reforms.").
15. See Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers:
New Remedies vs. Old Policies, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 537, 541 (1997) (Objections by
the bar to SEC regulation of the conduct of corporate counsel "center on [the]
views that the SEC's actions are an unwarranted interference with the lawyerclient relationship and the bar's independence."). Professor Maxey notes that
"[airguments in favor of professional independence ring with a certain bravado in
light of the bar's failure to develop and enforce professional guidelines for
transactional lawyering, in general, and securities lawyering in particular." Id. at
578.
16. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
17. Id. at 713.
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against the attorneys prohibiting future violations of the
federal securities laws, stating that "[tihe Court is
confident that they will take appropriate steps to ensure
that their professional conduct in the future comports with
the law.""8 The bar weighed in against the SEC's position
in the case, which may explain why the court refused to
issue an injunction and expressed its confidence in the
lawyers. 9
In In re Carter and Johnson,0 the SEC staff brought
an administrative proceeding against lawyers for aiding
and abetting a corporation's violations in failing to disclose
the company's precarious financial situation while it was
issuing securities; indeed, the company refused to take the
advice of its lawyers to make the necessary disclosure, after
which the lawyers did nothing. The Commission found
that the lawyers were drawn into the fraud and used "as a
shield to avoid the pressure exerted by the banks toward
disclosure. Such a role is a perversion of the normal
lawyer-client relationship, and no lawyer may claim that,
in these circumstances, he need do no more than
stubbornly continue to suggest disclosure when he knows
his suggestions are falling on deaf ears."2 1 Nevertheless,
the Commission refused to impose an administrative
sanction because it found that it had never before
articulated standards for lawyer conduct in representing a
corporation and therefore "no finding of unethical or
unprofessional conduct would be appropriate."22
The SEC's efforts to regulate the conduct of corporate
counsel was strongly opposed by the bar, effectively causing

18. Id. at 716.
19. See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle
with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236, 1249 (2003) ("It is difficult to overstate
the vehemence of the bar's reaction to the SEC complaint [in National Student
Marketing]; references to the return of King George were commonplace, and the
rhetoric suggested that the liberty of all Americans was at stake.") [hereinafter
Koniak, Bar's Struggle].
20. 22 S.E.C. Docket 292, 1981 WL 384414 (SEC Rel. No. 34-17597), Feb. 28,
1981.
21. Id. at*29.
22. Id. at *30.

334

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:323

the Commission's staff to back away from regulating the
conduct of lawyers practicing securities law.13 Nevertheless,
the SEC's enforcement staff tried again a few years later in
In the Matter of Kern24 to obtain an order directing
compliance with the securities laws against a lawyer who
served as a director of a corporation to which he was also its
principal outside counsel. Although an administrative law
judge found that Kern had caused the company to violate
the disclosure requirements of the securities law, the full
Commission refused to issue the order because it found that
it did not have the statutory authority to do so.2"
In these cases, the organized bar strongly opposed the
SEC's enforcement efforts to define a standard of conduct
for corporate counsel.26 In the face of such opposition, the
23. See Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against
Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 Bus. Law. 1273, 1300-1301 (1995) ("The SEC's early
enforcement actions against lawyers proved highly controversial among both
practitioners and academic commentators. Indeed, the controversy over those
cases became so heated as to affect the Commission's ability to carry out its
statutory mandates, which, both in the area of disclosure and enforcement,
depend on a certain degree of cooperation and trust between the Commission (and
its staff) and the private securities bar."). The controversy ended when the
Commission's General Counsel, Edward Greene, stated in a speech that the SEC
would not pursue disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer unless a federal court
first found that the lawyer had violated the securities laws, which would
necessarily find that the lawyer acted with scienter in the violation. Id. at 1304.
24. 49 S.E.C Docket 422, 1991 WL 284804 (Rel. No. 34-29356), June 21, 1991.
25. Id. at *4 ("Section 15(c)(4) should not now be construed to authorize an
administrative remedy of this nature."). The Commission staff initiated the
action under § 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(4), which provides:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that
any person subject to the provisions of section 781, 78m, 78n of this title or
subsection (d) of this section or any rule or regulation thereunder has failed
to comply with any such provision, rule, or regulation in any material
respect, the Commission may publish its findings and issue an order
requiring such person, and any person who was a cause of the failure to
comply due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known
would contribute to the failure to comply, to comply, or to take steps to
effect compliance, with such provision or such rule or regulation
thereunder upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the
Commission may specify in such order.
26. See Maxey, supra note 15, at 538 ("the organized bar has done little to
establish standards of conduct useful to securities lawyers. The bar has not
hesitated, however, to focus its resources on resisting the SEC's attempts to
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Commission largely backed down, sending a clear message:
The SEC would not police lawyers to ensure that they keep
corporate clients from engaging in wrongdoing.2 7 With that
approach, it is easy to see how lawyers for companies could
put on the blinders necessary to permit them to continue to
represent clients engaged in potentially illegal conduct by
not asking any questions and doing the client's bidding
without knowing all the relevant facts.28 At Enron, for
example, no one, including both the company's in-house
and outside lawyers, was willing to see a conflict of interest
for what it was when the company's Chief Financial
Officer, Andrew Fastow, engaged in a series of transactions
that involved, at least in hindsight, naked self-dealing.29
An internal investigation of the transactions after the
assert authority over setting professional standards.").
27. I do not want to give the impression that lawyers receive a complete free
pass under the securities laws-they do not. The SEC brings cases against
lawyers for aiding and abetting the securities law violations of their clients. For
example, in SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996), the court held that
"[blecause Fehn had a hand in editing the Form 10-Q's, and because he failed to
properly advise [the CEO and the corporation] of the material omissions in the
Form 10-Q's, instead submitting those forms to the SEC for filing, we conclude
that Fehn lent the requisite 'substantial assistance'" to violate the securities laws.
Id. at 1293-94. Fehn is an action for a past violation, and not an effort to direct
the conduct of lawyers to ensure that they prevent misconduct by the corporate
client. Section 307 is designed to impose a duty on corporate counsel to take steps
to prevent misconduct, which is much different from merely holding individual
lawyers liable for their misdeeds that rise to the level of securities fraud. The law
takes lawyers a step further by requiring action, and not simply permitting
inaction that might not amount to a violation of the securities laws and thereby
avoid any direct liability.
28. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1203 ("The Enron lawyers, however, seemed
mostly content with a system structured so that they were given very limited
information and assignments of very limited scope, because the managers were
determined to disclose as little as possible about their questionable
transactions.").
29. See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 195, 197 ("In short, it was Enron CFO Andrew Fastow's will (used in
service of his interests) that was manifest on both sides of the 'negotiation.' All in
all, these transactions were more like an eyelash-length, than an arms-length,
negotiation.") [hereinafter Koniak, Corporate Fraud]; Ryan Morrison, Note, Turn
up the Volume: The Need for "Noisy Withdrawal" in a Post-Enron Society, 92 Ky.
L. Rev. 279, 288-289 (2003) ("Vinson & Elkins knew it was a breach of Fastow's
fiduciary duties to engage in these deals, but the firm did not have the courage to
do anything about it.").
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company filed for bankruptcy determined that Enron had
an obligation to disclose the "amount of [Fastow's] interest
in the transaction(s), not just his income. The lawyers
apparently searched for and embraced a technical rationale
to avoid that disclosure. It appears that the in-house
Enron lawyers and Vinson & Elkins agreed with these
disclosure decisions ....,30
It was against this background of bar opposition and
SEC reticence to push further into policing the conduct of
securities lawyers that § 307 emerged to give the
Commission specific authority to regulate corporate counsel
and a mandate to adopt effective rules of professional
conduct. Senator Edwards offered an amendment to the
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002-as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
then named-to empower the SEC to apply its rulemaking
authority to draft and impose a standard for corporate
counsel to report wrongdoing by officers and employees to
senior officials in the corporation and, if necessary, to the
board of directors or its audit committee. Senator Edwards
described the need for adopting a provision permitting the
SEC to police the conduct of corporate counsel:
What we have seen some lawyers do, unfortunately, is
different. We have seen corporate lawyers sometimes forget
who their client is. What happens is their day-to-day
conduct is with the CEO or the chief financial officer
because those are the individuals responsible for hiring
them. So as a result, that is with whom they have a
relationship. When they go to lunch with their client, the
corporation, they are usually going to lunch with the CEO
or the chief financial officer. When they get phone calls,
they are usually returning calls to the CEO or the chief
financial officer. The problem is that the CEO and the chief
financial officer are not the client. Their responsibility and
the client they have to advocate for-and which they have
30. Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the
Board of Directors of Enron Corp., Feb. 1, 2002, at 189-90, available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/sec/2002/2002-02-07-8-k.pdf
(last visited
Nov. 4, 2004).
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an ethical responsibility to advocate for-is, in fact, the
corporation, not the CEO or the chief financial officer.
One of the most critical responsibilities that those lawyers
have is, when they see something occurring or about to
occur that violates the law, breaks the law, they must act as
an advocate for the shareholders, for the company itself, for
the investors. They are there and they can see what is
happening. They know the law and their responsibility is to
do something about it if they see the law being broken or
about to be broken.
This amendment is about making sure those lawyers, in
addition to the accountants and executives in the company,
don't violate the law and, in fact, more importantly, ensure
that the law is being followed."

Section 307, adopted overwhelmingly by the Senate
and ultimately included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, seeks
to change how lawyers representing corporations should
act in response to corporate wrongdoing. The provision is
quite brief, requiring the SEC to set "minimum standards
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers" which must include the adoption
of a rule embodying the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement.32 It is important to note that while the up31. 148 Cong. Rec. S6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Edwards) (emphasis added).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). The full text of § 307 provides:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection
of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in
the representation of issuers, including a rule(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
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the-ladder provision is one specified standard of
professional conduct, § 307 clearly contemplates a grant of
much broader authority to the SEC to set additional
standards for attorneys representing corporations that
issue securities to the public. Section 307 is the starting
point, not the end of the discussion. To view the provision
as simply an effort to enact a rather modest change in the
ethical requirements of the profession misreads the
ultimate purpose of the law: to ensure that lawyers work to
prevent wrongdoing by impeding it once it is recognized.
II. THE SEC RESPONDS TO § 307
Section 307 specifically mandates the adoption of an
up-the-ladder reporting requirement for corporate counsel.
The SEC adopted a detailed rule that requires counsel to
report a "material violation" that the person "reasonably
believes" has occurred or is taking place to the company's
chief legal officer (CLO) or equivalent, or to the CLO and
the company's CEO "forthwith."3 3 A material violation
"means a material violation of an applicable United States
federal or state securities law, a material breach of
fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state
law, or a similar material violation of any United States
federal or state law."34 This requirement is broader than
policing violations of only the federal securities laws
because it incorporates the state corporate law of fiduciary
duty-commonly described as the duties of due care,
loyalty, and candor-that reach an array of transactions
that may not involve directly the capital markets or
transactions in securities.
The SEC can institute
disciplinary proceedings under rule 102(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice for a violation of the rule

committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
34. Id. § 205.2(i).
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that can result in an order suspending or barring an
35
attorney from practicing before the Commission.
The reporting requirement is triggered when the
attorney becomes aware of "credible evidence, based upon
which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances,
for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that
it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. "36
The
Commission's definition of the up-the-ladder reporting
trigger has been roundly criticized because the standard is
almost incomprehensible.
The prior draft of the rule
required the attorney to report as "evidence that would
lead an attorney reasonably to believe that a material
violation has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur."
The SEC asserted that the new definition "clarifies aspects
of the objective standard that the Commission sought to
achieve in the definition originally proposed," although it is
difficult to see how this convoluted standard clarifies the
law.
The change incorporates both a subjective and
objective standard, which the prior definition did not.
Proving that the attorney acted unreasonably on both
grounds will be difficult because the Commission's use of
the double negative "unreasonable ...not to conclude" is
hardly a comprehensible legal standard.3 7 Moreover, as
Professor Hazen noted, "It is ironic that in drafting this
standard, the SEC violated one of its own drafting
principles. Specifically in its plain English requirements
that apply to many SEC filings by public companies, the
SEC admonishes against the use of double negatives."3 8

35. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).
36. Id. § 205.2(c).
37. See Koniak, Bar's Struggle, supra note 19, at 1275 ("Law is also supposed
to be capable of enforcement. Imagine trying to show that it was unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent lawyer not to have concluded that a
material violation of law had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur. The
double negative, of course, makes this difficult to do, as the rule slips away from
you as soon as you try to think about it.").
38. Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice-A
Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55
Admin. L. Rev. 323, 350 n.139 (2003).
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Regardless of the strengths or weaknesses of the upthe-ladder reporting rule, it does not break any new
ground.
The Commission's position in Student Loan
Marketing and In re Carter and Johnson has been that
lawyers must report wrongdoing by the corporation and its
officers to senior officials or, if necessary, the board of
directors. Although the American Bar Association (ABA)
rules for the profession were not as clear on the subject,
after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the ABA
amended Model Rule 1.13 in 2003 so that the rule largely
incorporates the up-the-ladder reporting requirement."
39. See Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 59 Bus. L. 145 (2003). The Task Force explained the changes to
Model Rule 1.13(b) that incorporates more clearly the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement:
Currently, Rule 1.13(b) requires a lawyer for an organizational client to act
when the lawyer "knows" that a person within the organization is violating
or intends to violate the law and is likely to cause substantial injury to the
organization.
The Task Force recommends that this prerequisite be
revised to differentiate between knowledge of facts and evaluation of legal
consequences.
As under the current rule, the starting point of the
recommended rule is subjective: the obligation to take action would arise
only on the basis of the facts known to the lawyer. The proposed trigger for
requiring action by the lawyer then proceeds to an objective test, namely,
whether a reasonable lawyer who knows such facts would, in similar
circumstances, conclude that the conduct in which a constituent is
engaging or intends to engage constitutes a violation of law or duty to the
organization that is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization. This standard recognizes that there is a range of reasonable
conduct, and that a lawyer satisfies that standard by acting within that
range. Moreover, it does not imply any duty on the lawyer's part to
investigate or inquire further as to information provided by a client or the
client's agent, or by a person to whom the lawyer has been referred by the
client. Although the lawyer is under no duty to investigate or inquire,
however, the lawyer may not simply accept such information at face value
if to do so would be unreasonable in the circumstances.
The second substantive change to Rule 1.13(b) recommended by the Task
Force addresses the lawyer's obligation to report wrongdoing to higher
authority in the organizational client. Currently, that rule identifies
"reporting up" as a potential course of action when the lawyer has
discerned an actual or threatened violation of law or violation of legal
obligation to the organization, but the Rule imposes no clear obligation to
pursue that course of action. The Task Force believes, however, that the
Rule should more actively encourage such action, by requiring that the
lawyer refer the matter to higher authority in the organization-including,
if warranted, the organization's highest authority-unless the lawyer
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Both regulations reflect what should be the exercise of
sound judgment in representing a corporation, that any
misconduct by a corporation's agent or officer must be
reported to senior management or the organization's
highest authority, which is usually the board of directors.
Any other response by corporate counsel is improper, and
may entail substantial assistance to the wrongdoer that
would subject a lawyer to criminal prosecution and an SEC
civil enforcement action. The up-the-ladder reporting rule
is a non-event for corporate counsel.
The next stage, however, is much more important, and
much more controversial. In addition to the up-the-ladder
reporting rule, the Commission proposed a second step if
the response of the corporation's senior managers or its
board was insufficient to rectify the problem: "noisy
withdrawal."" The SEC's proposal would have required an
reasonably believes that it is not necessary to do so.
Id. at 166-67.
40. The proposed "noisy withdrawal rule" provided:
(d) Notice to the Commission where there is no appropriate response within
a reasonable time. (1) Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a
material violation under paragraph 3(b) of this section rather than
paragraph 3(c) of this section does not receive an appropriate response, or
has not received a response in a reasonable time, to his or her report, and
the attorney reasonably believes that a material violation is ongoing or is
about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or of investors:
(i) An attorney retained by the issuer shall:
(A) Withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicating that the
withdrawal is based on professional considerations;
(B) Within one business day of withdrawing, give written notice to the
Commission of the attorney's withdrawal, indicating that the withdrawal
was based on professional considerations; and
(C) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, document,
affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document
filed with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a
document, that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that
the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or
misleading;
(ii) An attorney employed by the issuer shall:
(A) Within one business day, notify the Commission in writing that he or
she intends to disaffirm some opinion, document, affirmation,
representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed with or
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outside attorney who did not receive "an appropriate
response" within a reasonable time to the report of a
material violation, and who reasonably believed the
violation "is likely to result in substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or of investors,"
to "withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer,
indicating that the withdrawal is based on professional
consideration." Further, the attorney must, within one
business day, notify the Commission in writing of the
attorney's withdrawal for "professional considerations" and
to disaffirm any filing that the attorney believed contained
false or misleading information.
The proposed rule
imposed an additional duty on the corporation, that "[t]he
issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent) shall inform
any attorney retained or employed to replace the attorney
who has withdrawn that the previous attorney's
withdrawal was based on professional considerations."
The proposed rule treated in-house counsel differently,
however, by not requiring those lawyers to withdraw from
representing their client because that would require them
to quit their jobs. The Commission stated, "Requiring an
in-house attorney employed by the issuer to resign when
that attorney receives an inappropriate response to the
attorney's reported evidence of an ongoing or impending
material violation appears to be unreasonably harsh."4' Inhouse lawyers would, however, have to disaffirm any filings
with the SEC that contained false or misleading
information, requiring the "noise" without the withdrawal.

submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a document, that
the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney
reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading; and
(B) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission, in writing, any such opinion,
document, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like; and
(iii) The issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent) shall inform any
attorney retained or employed to replace the attorney who has withdrawn
that the previous attorney's withdrawal was based on professional
considerations.
Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 7.
41. Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 7.
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The Commission explained its rationale for the "noisy
withdrawal" rule: "[T]he proposed rule incorporates several
corollary provisions that are not explicitly required by
Section 307, but which the Commission believes are
important components of an effective 'up the ladder'
reporting system." The SEC viewed the noisy withdrawal
rule as protecting the corporation's ultimate owners-the
shareholders-when an attorney learned about corporate
misconduct and the up-the-ladder reporting mechanism did
not work to rectify the misconduct. The duty to report the
reason for prior counsel's withdrawal to the next lawyer
would prevent the corporation from continuing a course of
misconduct by retaining new attorneys who would not
learn of the wrongdoing for at least some period of time or,
even worse, by shifting the legal work in-house because
those attorneys would be completely beholden to
management.4 3
The SEC invited comments to its proposed rules to
implement § 307, and it received a deluge of objections
focused largely on the "noisy withdrawal" provision.44 In
response to those objections, the Commission's final rule
did not include the noisy withdrawal requirement, but it
did invite comment on a slightly different type of noise that
42. The Commission explained:
Requiring such "noisy withdrawal" appears appropriate to protect
shareholders and investors, where the reported material violation appears
likely to result in substantial financial injury to the issuer or investors, by
effectively requiring an issuer's directors to act and by virtually ensuring
an immediate inquiry by the Commission if they do not.
Id.
43. The Commission stated:
The purpose of this paragraph is to avoid a situation in which successor
attorneys are unaware that the previous attorney waved a red flag in
withdrawing. Under such circumstances, an issuer engaged in fraud may
shift work previously done by outside attorneys to its own in-house legal
staff, over which it has more control, and it may take the successor
attorneys some time to become aware of the evidence of material violations
that led the previous attorneys to withdraw.
Id.
44. Comments on the proposed rules implementing § 307 are available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2004), and
the site contains over 150 comments.
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would require the corporation, rather than the lawyer, to
report the lawyer's withdrawal because of the inadequacy
of the response to an up-the-ladder report of a material
violation.4 5 This new approach avoids having the lawyer
make the disclosure, thereby skirting the problem of
having attorneys disclose information that may reveal
46
client confidences.
The bar's response to this proposal was just as
negative, and the Commission has not taken any steps at
this point to implement either form of reporting attorney
withdrawal, nor has it mandated any withdrawal
requirement for corporate counsel. The bar has defeated
the SEC's attempt to give the rule any real teeth by
keeping the entire process of attorney reporting private,
and absolving corporate counsel from any responsibility to
withdraw in the face of resistance to the up-the-ladder
reporting by corporate management and directors.4 7

45. In releasing its final rule implementing § 307, the Commission stated:
[W]e are also proposing and soliciting comment on an alternative procedure
to the "noisy withdrawal" provisions. Under this proposed alternative, in
the event that an attorney withdraws from representation of an issuer
after failing to receive an appropriate response to reported evidence of a
material violation, the issuer would be required to disclose its counsel's
withdrawal to the Commission as a material event.
68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297 (Feb. 6, 2003); SEC Rel. No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003). The
proposed rule states: "Where an attorney has provided an issuer with a written
notice pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section, the issuer shall,
within two business days of receipt of such written notice, report such notice and
the circumstances related thereto on Form 8-K, 20-F, or 40- F (§§ 249.308, 220f or
240f of this chapter), as applicable." Proposed Rule 205.3(e), 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6337 (Feb. 6, 2003); SEC Rel. No. 33-8186 (Jan. 29, 2003).
46. Even if the client is required to disclose rather than the lawyer, that does
not vitiate the problem with a rule that potentially compels the disclosure of
privileged communications. The privilege protects both the lawyer and the client
from having to reveal their communications that come within the privilege, while
the attorney's duty to protect all client confidences is broader.
47. See Thomas Rose, Lawyers and Fraud: A Better Question, 43 Washburn
L.J. 45, 58 (2003) ("It is hardly surprising, and no accident, that the SEC blinked
on the 'noisy withdrawal' piece of its proposed rules. It will be interesting to see
how the SEC ultimately decides this deferred question, although history suggests
that the SEC will ultimately cede this normative space to the bar.").
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III. THE BAR FIGHTS "Noisy WITHDRAWAL"
To say that the legal profession reacted negatively to
the proposed "noisy withdrawal" portion of the proposed
rule is an understatement."'
The objections from the
private bar focused largely on the SEC reporting
requirement for withdrawing attorneys, and advanced two
principal grounds: the need to protect lawyer-client
confidentiality and interference with the lawyer-client
relationship to guard against overreaching or misuse of
power afforded by a lawyer independent of the government
whose sole goal is representing the interests of the client.
The rhetoric used to advance these positions was
sometimes a bit overblown, and makes one wary whether
the real interest was that of the lawyers seeking to thwart
yet another effort at government regulation that would
make them more accountable for the representation of
corporate clients.
On the issue of whether the "noisy withdrawal" rule
would violate the attorney-client privilege, former SEC
Commissioner Joseph Grundfest argued that "[t]he
requirement that attorneys specifically identify documents
that have in the past been 'filed with or submitted to' the
Commission and that are believed to be materially false or
misleading again creates a clear conflict with established
principles of attorney-client privilege that prohibit
disclosure of past offenses and that rely on criteria that
differ dramatically from those relied upon by the Proposed
Rules."49 The law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell took a more
aggressive approach, arguing that "the adoption of noisy
withdrawal rules by the Commission would represent such
a radical departure from the traditional standards of

48. See Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Sarah Smith Kelleher, Bring on 'Da Noise:
The SEC's Proposals Concerning Professional Conduct for Attorneys under
Sarbanes-Oxley, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 599, 603 (2003) ('The hue and cry that
followed the [Noisy Withdrawal] Rule was loud and immediate.").
49. Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest et al., Dec. 23, 2002, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jagrundfestl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
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behavior for attorneys and the expectations of their clients
that it should be deferred until such time as the
Commission has had the opportunity to undertake a more
detailed examination of the issue and its implications."5
Law firms argued that the disclosure requirement of
the proposed rule would cause the officers of corporate
clients to reveal less information because of the fear of
disclosure to the SEC. A group of seventy-seven law firms
submitted a letter arguing that the rule would cause more
harm rather than prevent corporate misconduct:
In the vast majority of cases counsel enjoy the confidence of
their clients and, given access to the facts by their clients,
succeed in persuading their clients to refrain from actions
that harm the investing public. If clients are afraid to
confide candidly and completely in their counsel and instead
proceed without the advice of counsel, the public will
inevitably be harmed in some cases when it need not have
been. Or clients may be prompted to avoid cautious and
prudent counsel, with the same result. The basic force for
conformance of business conduct to legal norms is a strong
and independent Bar that enjoys the trust and confidence of
its clients.5
The law firms viewed the rule as one that would discourage
communication rather than as a means to protect the
corporate client.
The theme of lawyer independence
appeared in conjunction with the need for confidentiality as
a basis to attack the "noisy withdrawal" rule. The Jones
Day law firm asserted:
An attorney's overriding duty is that of zealous advocacy on
behalf of the client, which includes advising the client as to
50. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, Dec. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sullivancl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
51. Letter from
77 Law
Firms, Dec.
18,
2002, available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirmsl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004). One can express a certain amazement that seventy-seven law firms could
agree on anything, but when a rule threatens the financial interests of the
corporate bar, it may be easier to gain their assent.

20041 SECTION 307 AND CORPORATE COUNSEL

347

possible violations of the law (including advice to the effect
that the law has not been violated). To do this effectively an
attorney must be apprised of the entire universe of
information that bears on a client's given situation. Our
legal system has long recognized the need for full and frank
discussions between clients and attorneys. In fact, we
believe that attorney-client counseling is the best means to
prevent client misconduct. By requiring an attorney to
withdraw and by making that withdrawal "noisy" (whether
because the attorney must inform the Commission or the
issuer must file a Form 8-K), Section 3(d) would impede full
and frank discussions between attorneys and their clients.52
Similarly, the group of law firms-now expanded to
seventy-nine-argued against the Commission's rule
requiring the corporation to disclose the withdrawal, rather
than the lawyer, by asserting that "[tihe basic force for
conformance of business conduct to legal norms is a strong
and independent Bar that enjoys the trust and confidence
of its clients," and so any form of public notice of
withdrawal would undermine the very reason the corporate
client retained the lawyer.53
52. Letter
from
Jones
Day,
April
7,
2003,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jonesday040703.htm (last visited Nov.
1, 2004).
53. Letter
from
79 Law
Firms, April
7, 2003,
available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirmsl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004). The analogy to the lawyer advocating the client's position in litigation has
been criticized for misconstruing the role of corporate counsel who advise clients
on a continuing basis outside of an adversarial proceeding. See Sean J. Griffith,
Afterword and Comment: Toward an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 Conn.
L. Rev. 1223, 1230 (2003) ("If professional ethics are primarily influenced by
norms of advocacy, which permit conduct going right up to the boundary of
illegality, and it is very hard, as in the Enron and Lincoln transactions, to tell
where those boundaries are, lawyers may indeed comply with their ethical duties
while helping their clients to defraud regulators, tax collectors, creditors,
customers, and investors."); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An
Agenda for the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1294 (2003) ("This view of the
lawyer as the client's shield against an oppressive state is no doubt right with
respect to the role of the litigator, but the question remains whether his
description of the attorney's role applies as well--or at all-to the securities
attorney.") [hereinafter Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper]; Koniak, Bar's Struggle,
supra note 19, at 1278-79 ("the bar claims that the state's law would prevent
advisors-lawyers who facilitate client transactions before the fact and during a
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The proposed rule drew similar criticisms from foreign
bar associations that weighed in because the SEC's
proposal covered some foreign lawyers who represent
corporations whose securities are traded in the United
States. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations stated
that any form of "noisy withdrawal" would have the effect
that "a client would be disincentivized from consulting
freely with its attorney."5 4 The Canadian Bar Association
claimed that the proposed rule would "invade the special
relationship of trust which must prevail between an
attorney and his or her client."5 5 The New Zealand Law
Society stated:
Currently, lawyers and their clients can engage in vigorous
confidential debate as to the appropriate course when faced
with challenging factual circumstances. Yet under the
proposed rules, such debate will be stifled if lawyers are
perceived as in effect having a veto power through the
threat of "noisy withdrawal" and the debate itself ultimately
being made public, irrespective of whether the lawyer's
opinion might subsequently be proved wrong.56
If so many lawyers claim that "noisy withdrawal"
would cause more harm than good by interfering in the
lawyer-client relationship, don't they have to be right?
There is, of course, a measure of self-interest in the bar's
protestations about the proposed rule.
Regulation of
corporate lawyers through the state disciplinary apparatus
is minimal, at best, and aside from the SEC there are no

transaction's life (before any accusation of wrongdoing)-from performing a
function good for the world-helping people to comply with the law. How?").
54. Letter from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, March 31, 2003,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tmotobayashil.htm
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2004).
55. Letter from the Canadian Bar Association, March 20, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/svpotterl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
56. Letter from the New Zealand Law Society, Dec. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/mverbiestl.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004)
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viable regulators of securities and corporate lawyers.,"
Along the same line, the Supreme Court's decision in
Central Bank in 1994 rejected aiding and abetting liability
as a basis for pursuing private rule 10b-5 securities fraud
actions, largely removing the threat of damages actions by
investors against lawyers and other professionals who
advise corporations that issue securities."' While lawyers
are subject to malpractice claims, when the corporation is
the client it is difficult to pursue a claim that involves legal
advice to the company's officers who commit wrongdoing on
the corporation's behalf. The lawyers can assert an in pari
delicto defense, arguing that the client's wrongdoingthrough the conduct of its officers or employees-means
that the corporation's "unclean hands" should prevent it
from recovering for any malpractice by the lawyers in
advising management or failing to notice their fraud.59
57. See Koniak, Bar's Struggle, supra note 19, at 1280 ("The state disciplinary
systems lack the expertise in securities law, the staff, and the monetary resources
to take on a major securities firm. They can't do it and they don't. Thus, when
the bar says leave securities lawyers to the states, it means to leave them
unregulated.").
58. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994). See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of
Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1297
(1999) ("In Central Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that section 10(b) does
not permit liability to be imposed upon those who aid and abet federal securities
fraud. The decision came with little warning-courts and commentators had
widely accepted the validity of aiding and abetting liability."). The Supreme
Court did recognize that lawyers and other secondary actors could be held liable
as primary violators of § 10(b), but it did not explain what would be required for
such liability. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 ("The absence of § 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets
are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity,
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of
the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.").
59. The Ninth Circuit, in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), held that the FDIC, as
the receiver for a failed thrift, could bring a malpractice action against the thrift's
outside counsel and auditor for failing to perform a "reasonable, independent
investigation" despite the fact that the firm's managers were largely responsible
for the misconduct. Id. at 749. Where the malpractice claim involves conduct by
the managers of the corporation, however, the attorneys can raise the equitable
defense of in pari delicto or "unclean hands" to argue that the corporation was
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The noisy withdrawal rule, as originally proposed,
would not require the reporting lawyer to reveal any
specific confidential communications, only that the reason
for the withdrawal and disaffirmation of corporate filings
was due to the company's failure to respond adequately to
the report of a material violation. This is similar to the
withdrawal requirement for appointed counsel in criminal
cases if a client intends to engage in illegal conduct, such as
committing perjury or submitting falsified evidence.6" The
revised rule requiring corporate disclosure of the
withdrawal, rather than by the company's lawyer, takes
the disclosure one step further from any problem with
attorney confidentiality because a client does not act under
any requirement to maintain secrecy. Moreover, while
ABA Model Rule 1.6 permitted disclosure of client
communications to prevent a future crime only if it
involved death or substantial bodily harm, a majority of the
states allow-but do not require-such disclosure to
prevent a client from causing significant financial harm or
to rectify the consequences of past harm if the lawyer's
services were used to commit the harmful act. Indeed, the
ABA revised Model Rule 1.6 in 2003, largely in response to
both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and calls for greater lawyer

equally responsible for the harm and therefore cannot recover from the lawyers
for its own misconduct, even if they were negligent. See, e.g, In re Dublin
Securities Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997) (The trustee in bankrupctcy for
the corporation "admits in his complaint that the debtors' own actions were
instrumental in perpetrating the fraud on the individuals choosing to invest in
the Dublin Securities schemes. That pleading concedes, for example, that the
debtors intentionally defrauded their investors. Such purposeful conduct thus
establishes conclusively that the debtors were at least as culpable as the
defendants in this matter.").
60. See Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.16, cmt. para. 3 (1983) ("When a
lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires
approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval
or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer
withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal
is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct.
The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may
be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation.
The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of
the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.").
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accountability, to conform its rule to the majority and
permit disclosure of confidential information by a lawyer
whose client is committing or intends to commit a crime
involving significant financial harm.6 '
The disclosure
required by the noisy withdrawal rule was hardly unknown
to lawyers, and was consistent with the practice of a
majority of the states permitting lawyers to disclosure far
more than just the attorney's withdrawal
from
representation because of the client's financial misconduct.
Although the noisy withdrawal rule was neither
radical nor an earth-shattering change in the lawyer-client
relationship, as its opponents alleged, its adoption would
alter the role of lawyers by giving them more of a
"gatekeeper" function. The rationale offered by the SEC for
seeking the noise that would accompany the attorney's
withdrawal was that "Ir]equiring such 'noisy withdrawal'
appears appropriate to protect shareholders and investors
.... "62 By viewing the rule as a means to protect investors,
and not just the corporation that is technically the lawyer's
client apart from its agents or owners, the Commission
gave corporate counsel a larger public responsibility apart
from the limited goals of the client.
Professor Coffee defines a "gatekeeper" as a
"reputational intermediar[y] who provide[s] verification
and certification services to investors."63
Professor
61. Model Rule 1.6(b) now provides:
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:...
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services;
62. Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 7.
63. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1404 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding
Enron]. Among those who qualify as a gatekeeper are accountants, securities
analysts, those providing a fairness opinion on a transaction, and lawyers. Id.
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Hamdani provides a more restrictive definition of the term,
limiting it to "parties who sell a product or provide a
service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a
particular market or engage in certain activities."64
Although legal services are not mandated by law, unlike
the requirement for certified financial statements provided
by accountants for publicly traded companies, no
corporation acts without regularly consulting legal counsel,
and most have both in-house attorneys and retain outside
law firms for legal advice. In that sense, lawyers provide a
necessary service to corporate clients and can be made to
serve the interests of both the corporation and third
parties, such as investors and regulatory agencies.
The issue is whether imposing a gatekeeper role on
lawyers representing corporations whose shares are
publicly traded is a good idea. The fact that corporate
counsel will not be completely "independent" to represent
solely the wishes of the client is one oft-repeated criticism
of the "noisy withdrawal" rule. Jones Day cited to the
"attorney's overriding duty ... of zealous advocacy on
behalf of the client" as the basis for arguing that any
disclosure was inappropriate, although that duty may not
be appropriate for corporate counsel advising a client in
transactional work.65
The American College of Trial
Lawyers-in a fit of hyperbole-asserted that the proposed
rule "would convert attorneys from representatives of their
clients' interests into policemen who act against their
clients' interests ....,,66
Similarly, the American Corporate
Counsel Association claimed that "[i]f we move toward
regulations that turn lawyers into cops on the beat, we will
be making a decision to fundamentally change the lawyerclient relationship .... "I' Not to be outdone, the Chicago
64. Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 So. Cal. L. Rev. 53, 58 (2003).
65. Letter from Jones Day, supra note 52.
66. Letter from the American College of Trial Lawyers, April 2, 2003,
available
at
http'//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/macooper1.htm
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2004).
67. Letter from the American Corporate Counsel Association, April 7, 2003,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/acca040703.htm
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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Bar Association opined that "[ilf the client must fear that
its own counselor, to whom it would confide its most
problematic concerns, may turn into its judge of no
recourse, resulting in mandatory public disclosure, the
client will hesitate to confide.
Correspondingly, the
attorney will hesitate to probe if she may become an
auditor or police officer if she learns too much." 8
The "cop on the beat" criticism misapprehends the
scope of the "noisy withdrawal" rule because lawyers,
especially those representing corporations, police their
clients in a number of ways to ensure that they comply
with the law. At a minimum, a lawyer cannot counsel a
client to commit a criminal or fraudulent act,69 so the
lawyer will act as a type of monitor overseeing the
propriety of the corporate client's conduct, i.e., a type of
auditor or cop. Turning the lawyer into a gatekeeper with
a responsibility to report misconduct by a client by
disclosing the fact of withdrawal could affect the quality of
attorney-client communication in a corporation in some
instances, but it is unlikely that corporate officers and
directors can forego using attorneys because there is a
possibility that they might have to withdraw from
representation and disclose that fact.70

68. Letter from the Chicago Bar Association, April 7. 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/chicagobar040703.htm
(last visited
Nov. 4, 2004).
69. Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.2(d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyers knows is criminal
or fraudulent").
70. Professor Coffee asserts that the only "chill" that the noisy withdrawal
rule will have on attorney-client communications is in the situation when the
corporate officer considers whether to seek legal advice from the company's
lawyer after the conduct that may be a violation, not before. Unlike the ex ante
consultation with counsel, once the act is complete, the officer cannot conform it
to any legal requirements and will be more likely to try to cover up the conduct if
it is potentially illegal, avoiding the lawyer who may have to report the violation.
Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 1307 ("it is the ex post inquiry
by the client of the attorney that is most likely to be chilled."). Professor Koniak
makes the same point, arguing that "corporate managers talk to lawyers. A
strong rule on reporting client fraud would not make corporate confidences any
more insecure than they already are, nor would it make corporate managers
suddenly afraid to talk to lawyers." Koniak, Bar's Struggle, supra note 19, at

354

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:323

A rigid approach that rejects any form of disclosure by
corporate counsel falls into the trap of viewing every
attorney-client relationship as fundamentally equivalent.
For example, the Conseil des Barreaux de L'Union
Europeene [Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Union] (CCBE) takes the position in its
"Statement of Position on Lawyers' Confidentiality" that
citizens "must be able to seek advice as to what is right or
wrong, legal or illegal. Such advice can only be sought if
the citizen can be assured that his or her communication
with the lawyer remains confidential."7 1
In fact, an
attorney for a corporation does not have a client in the
same sense that the criminal defense or estate planning
lawyer has a single human client who is easy to identify
and whose communications unquestionably will be
protected from disclosure. Corporations operate through
their human agents, and the attorney's job involves
gathering information from various sources within the firm
and evaluating the conduct and decisions of numerous
actors. The disclosure sought by the "noisy withdrawal"
rule arises in a limited context in which corporate counsel,
1279.
71. Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, Statement
of Position on Lawyer's Confidentiality, Feb. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/secretprofuk.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). Helge
Jakob Kolrud, president of the CCBE, in a speech on July 4, 2002, on the onehundredth anniversary of the Conference des Batonniers in Paris, asserted a
strict view rejecting any disclosure by lawyers about their clients:
However, it becomes much more difficult to argue this outside the two
areas of client waiver and danger to human life and health. In fact, I
would argue that those are the only two areas where exceptions should
usually be made. Outside those two areas, I tend-if that is possible once
exceptions have already been made-to the absolute view of the
professional secret. I do this not for the good of lawyers, but for the good of
clients and the health of society overall. It does not seem to me that the
areas of the fight against money-laundering or the fight against corporate
misgovernance fall anywhere near the two exceptions I have already
outlined. For those reasons, we in the CCBE are opposed to the extension
of exceptions. We very much regret that governments have seen fit in
recent years to extend their controls in these areas, and we will continue to
struggle against such extensions, in these or future areas.
Speech for 4 July, available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/speech 040703-en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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not an attorney for an individual, must make a limited
disclosure about the lawyer's withdrawal due to
wrongdoing by the agents of that client.7 2
The problem with the noisy withdrawal rule is that it
makes the fact of the lawyer's withdrawal an item for
public disclosure to investors and the SEC, thereby
triggering further scrutiny into the legal advice provided by
counsel. It is that information, however, that is clearly
within the protection of the attorney-client privilege, which
is held equally by corporations and individuals. 73 In that
sense, the noise from the withdrawal becomes a public
event inviting third parties to decipher the reasons for the
withdrawal for the cryptic "professional considerations" by
asking, or even demanding in an SEC investigation, what
information passed between the attorney and the
corporation. As a signal, the noise does not provide much
information, but it does create the impression that the
attorney is a gatekeeper who should report information to
the government and investing public, a role that does not
fit comfortably with the confidential relationship between
the attorney and client. The pressure on the company to
waive its privilege will be enormous, and similarly the
attorney may not be able to resist disclosure if the ethics
rule in place permits, but does not mandate, disclosure of a
pending or future financial crime or fraud.
The confidentiality attorneys must maintain is a
fundamental part of the relationship between lawyers and
clients, and is not something that should be easily
discarded. Good arguments can be made that lawyers can
be a valuable source of protection against corporate
misconduct, but is the price to corporations for limiting the
attorney-client privilege by mandating disclosure of the
lawyer's withdrawal too steep? It is a close question
because the benefits from requiring some disclosure could
72. See Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 1307 ("the ultimate
goal of the law is to achieve law compliance, not to maximize uninhibited
communications between the attorney and the client. Client confidentiality is a
means to an end, not an end in itself.").
73. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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be significant, yet the burden would be imposed on every
corporation with publicly traded shares, including a large
number of foreign issuers of securities whose attorneys
operate under a different system.
At bottom, the goal of imposing a gatekeeper role on
lawyers should be to protect investors and the public from
corporate misconduct that may result in substantial
financial losses. If that is the ultimate goal, then the type
of disclosure sought by the SEC in the noisy withdrawal
rule is not the only way to achieve that protection, and the
cost to the attorney-client relationship by threatened
revelation of confidential communications may be too great
to justify the noise that would accompany the withdrawal.
Without the public disclosure, can lawyers still be used
effectively to prevent corporate misconduct by adopting the
second half of the SEC's proposed rule, the mandatory
withdrawal requirement? The starting point for answering
that question is to consider the nature of corporate
misconduct that led to the adoption of § 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and how lawyers play a role in the
process by which corporations commit the types of financial
crimes that have cropped up over the years.
III. CORPORATE MISCONDUCT AND THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
The corporate misconduct that led to the SarbanesOxley Act was not particularly different from the types of
crimes by corporations in earlier times. Over a decade ago,
the so-called Savings & Loan crisis involved violations by
corporate officers and directors making improper loansoften to favored borrowers or even themselves-in an
attempt to grow their business and take advantage of an
explosion in real estate values.
In the 1980s, the
misconduct of Drexel Burnham in the junk bond market
involved various violations of securities law reporting
requirements. In the 1970s, the collapse of Equity Funding
involved accounting fraud that led to the largest insurance
company collapse to that time. One gets the feeling that
the only difference is the names of the players and,
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occasionally, the types of rules violated by the corporations
and their managers.
White collar crimes are quite different from the much
more prevalent street crimes in both the complexity of the
conduct and the immediacy of the harm. Unlike a robbery
or battery, which usually takes place in a very short period,
at an identifiable location, and with a human victim, white
collar crimes are often a process that leads to a result that
may be, but is not necessarily, criminal. For example, tax
evasion involves the failure to report income or taking
improper deductions that results in the underpayment of
taxes. Numerous books, websites, and computer programs
advise individuals how to pay less taxes, most of which are
perfectly legal. When does legitimate tax planning cross
over into improper evasion of taxes? Similarly, while it is
inconceivable to ask whether the removal of money from a
cash register while a gun is pointed at the store's proprietor
is legal, the transfer of funds between a domestic and
foreign bank may or may not be proper, depending on a
variety of circumstances.
Within the category of white collar crime are the
violations committed by corporations, which are often quite
different from the violations perpetrated by individuals
acting on their own. Some types of white collar crimes are
solely for personal gain, such as the insider trading of Dr.
Sam Waksal, former CEO of ImClone Systems. He sought
to avoid the loss in his shares in the company when it
revealed the status of its drug application with the FDA.
Similarly, the conviction of Martha Stewart for making
false statements related to her personal sale of ImClone
Systems stock involved personal acts wholly unrelated to
her position as CEO and chair of the board of Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc. Similarly, some types of
corporate crimes involve firms that are organized largely
for illegal purposes, such as companies that operate boilerrooms or advanced-loan fee schemes that are little more
than shells for individual criminality.
The types of corporate crime that came to light in 2002
that led to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved
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a different type of misconduct in which the motive was not
so much direct personal gain at the expense of individual
victims, but more to protect and enhance the corporate
enterprise and the position of the officers involved in the
misconduct within the hierarchy of an ostensibly successful
operation.
In many cases, revelation of the various
accounting and financial disclosure violations would have
caused the companies to suffer significant losses in the
market due to the pressure to provide consistent, and
increasing, income and revenue.
The accounting and
financial violations alleged at companies like Enron,
Adelphia, and WorldCom largely involved managers and
directors who sought to maintain the corporate enterprise
by bookkeeping and financial legerdemain. In the case of
WorldCom, the pressure to meet the expectations of Wall
Street led to improper accounting that is estimated to have
involved fraudulent accounting totaling $10.6 billion, while
its CEO had the company guarantee over $400 million in
4
loans so he could acquire more stock.1
While one cannot ignore the large payouts to officers
like Andrew Fastow of Enron as a motive for engaging in
misconduct, the more common scenario for corporate crime
involves a series of steps, often with fairly small amounts
at issue in the beginning, that lead almost inexorably to the
ultimate revelation of the misconduct because the
violations get too large to control. Crimes by organizations
usually start when managers cut corners or push to the
edge of legal conduct in an effort to maintain revenue and
profits. At some point, which is often imperceptible, the
line into illegality is crossed and the scheme seems to take
on a life of its own.
There is a rich literature on corporate crime, which I
will not try to summarize here, that discusses the
complexity of organizations and pressures within them to
74. Shawn Young, MCI Restatement Drops $74.4 Billion, Wall. St. J., March
15, 2004, at B2 (MCI restated its 2000 and 2001 income downward by $74.4
billion due to fraudulent accounting, and "[tihe fraud itself amounts to about
$10.6 billion in moves that mostly padded earnings by artificially reducing
expenses.").
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meet performance goals, especially when the firm suffers
from potential profit and revenue loss. The pressure
creates an environment ripe for corporate crime by the
company's managers.75 To take one example, Professors
Simpson and Piquero described the origins of corporate
crime in this way:
From an organizational perspective, then, corporate crime
results when managers take organizational needs and
pressures into account when solving business problems or
when managers act in accordance with the dominant
culture of the firm, subunit, or team in which they work. As
Vaughan (1999:289) summarizes it, "Theorists uniformly
hold that structures, processes, and tasks are opportunity
structures for misconduct because they provide (a)
normative support for misconduct, (b) the means for
carrying out violations, and (c) concealment that minimizes
detection and sanctioning." While some degree of selfinterest may underlie offending decisions (Yeager & Reed
1998), corporate crime is "not reducible to individuals and
their characteristics" (Tillman & Pontell 1994:1459) because
the individual and the organization are symbiotic.7"
What is the role of the lawyer in this process?
Professor Coffee describes corporate counsel as a
"transaction engineer" who provides advice on how the
corporation can structure its operations in a manner that
75. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. fli. L. Rev. 691, 702-03 ("an
agent generally will not commit Fraud on the Market so long as his future
employment seems assured. When the firm is ailing, however, an agent's
expectations of future employment no longer serve as a constraint on behavior.
In this situation a manager may view securities fraud as a positive net present
value project. Aside from criminal liability, in a last period the expected costs of
fraud (civil liability and job loss) are minimal, while the expected benefits of fraud
may have increased.").
76. Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control,
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 Law & Soc'y Rev. 509, 511
(2002). See Griffith, supra note 53, at 1242 ("Managers facing the failure of their
business may thus prefer to take the risks, including the risk of legal liability, of
lying to the markets than to suffer the more immediate consequences of the
market's reaction to the truth-that is, the further decline of their share price
and creditworthiness and the further degradation of their business prospects.").
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meets both business needs and the requirements of law.77
The vast array of federal and state regulatory regimes that
affect virtually every business, and especially the larger
operations of publicly traded companies, makes the lawyer
a vital player in corporate operations. Corporate counsel
will be present at most steps in the process of a business
decision, and will provide legal advice on an array of topics,
including litigation risks, taxation, regulatory compliance,
and the requirements of employment law, plus specialized
topics that relate to the enterprise, such as intellectual
property, foreign trade, or environmental law. For the
larger corporations that use the public markets for their
capital requirements, lawyers provide advice on the
securities laws, especially the continuing periodic
disclosure requirements. Lawyers are, quite simply, a fact
of life for any firm, and especially for the publicly traded
company operating in the current environment of close
scrutiny of corporate conduct.75
Lawyers interact with managers at all levels of the
company in order to gather the requisite information to
provide legal advice to the corporation.
Moreover,
managers often must seek out the lawyers to assist in
formulating a business plan or monitor the company's
compliance with applicable regulations in order to do their
job properly. Unlike a company's auditor, which conducts
an independent examination of the company's books to
ensure that they were created properly, 9 corporate counsel
likely is involved in the corporation's business on a
continuous basis and will have access to different types of
information than the auditor. Corporate counsel cannot
77. Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 63, at 1405 & 1417 ("lawyers
specialize in designing transactions to avoid regulatory, legal, and other costly
hurdles, but seldom provide meaningful certifications to investors.").
78. See Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 1307-08 ("the more
the government pursues white-collar criminal prosecutions and punitive
regulatory actions in the contemporary post-Enron environment, the more likely
it is that corporate officers will consult counsel before acting.").
79. See Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 63, at 1405 ("the
professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the corporate client's
own statements about itself or a specific transaction.").

2004] SECTION 307 AND CORPORATE COUNSEL

361

detect all types of corporate misconduct, but there is a
substantial likelihood that, at some point in the process, a
lawyer will be asked to review a transaction or advise on
how to structure it. In much the same way that the auditor
may be able to detect fraud based on its review of the
corporation's records and operations, so too the lawyer may
have "credible evidence" that the company is moving across
the line into illegality from the types of legal advice that is
sought by the corporation or the reports provided by
managers to the lawyer. 0
80. The rule specifically exempts application to attorneys retained to advise
the corporation about the issues raised in an up-the-ladder report. 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(b)(6)-(7) provides:
(6) An attorney shall not have any obligation to report evidence of a
material violation under this paragraph (b) if:
(i) The attorney was retained or directed by the issuer's chief legal officer
(or the equivalent thereof) to investigate such evidence of a material
violation and:
(A) The attorney reports the results of such investigation to the chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof); and
(B) Except where the attorney and the chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) each reasonably believes that no material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur, the chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) reports the results of the investigation to the issuer's board of
directors, a committee thereof to whom a report could be made pursuant to
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, or a qualified legal compliance committee;
or
(ii) The attorney was retained or directed by the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) to assert, consistent with his or her professional
obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or the issuer's
officer, director, employee, or agent, as the case may be) in any
investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to such
evidence of a material violation, and the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) provides reasonable and timely reports on the progress
and outcome of such proceeding to the issuer's board of directors, a
committee thereof to whom a report could be made pursuant to paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, or a qualified legal compliance committee.
(7) An attorney shall not have any obligation to report evidence of a
material violation under this paragraph (b) if such attorney was retained or
directed by a qualified legal compliance committee:
(i) To investigate such evidence of a material violation; or
(ii) To assert, consistent with his or her professional obligations, a colorable
defense on behalf of the issuer (or the issuer's officer, director, employee, or
agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or judicial or administrative
proceeding relating to such evidence of a material violation.
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If the lawyer has "evidence of a material violation"-admittedly a difficult standard to establish-then the upthe-ladder reporting requirement comes into play. The
SEC's rule further permits, but does not require, an
attorney to reveal confidential information to prevent an
illegal or fraudulent act by the corporation "that is likely to
cause substantial [financial] injury," to prevent a fraud
upon the Commission in an investigation, or to "rectify the
consequences of a material violation" that would cause a
significant financial injury.8'
This provision largely
duplicates Model Rule 1.6(c), as amended by the ABA in
the summer of 2003, and adds little to the ethical
responsibilities of corporate counsel.
Apart from the
permissive disclosure provision, however, corporate counsel
need do nothing further with regard to the corporate client
who refuses to act appropriately in response to the material
violation because the Commission dropped mandatory
withdrawal along with the disclosure requirement of its
proposed rule.

81. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) provides:
An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer may reveal to the Commission, without the
issuer's consent, confidential information related to the representation to
the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely
to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer
or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative
proceeding from committing perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1621;
suborning perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1622; or committing any act
proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the
Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the
attorney's services were used.
82. The only difference between the SEC rule and Model Rule 1.6 is that the
lawyer can disclose confidential information to prevent the corporation from
committing perjury or making a false statement in an investigation, crimes which
do not have a financial impact but affect the government's investigative
authority.
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By not mandating complete withdrawal, the
Commission left corporate counsel to operate only under
the ethical guidelines of the profession, which do not
require that an attorney cease representing a client except
in very limited circumstances. ABA Model Rule 1.16(1)
requires an attorney to withdraw if "the representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law .... ." While a lawyer may not counsel a client to
commit an unlawful or fraudulent act under Model Rule
1.2, if a lawyer merely discovers misconduct by the
corporate client but did not otherwise participate in it, then
withdrawal would not be required. Similarly, if a lawyer,
upon discovering misconduct, advised the client to remedy
the situation by, inter alia, making proper disclosure to the
SEC and the public, and the client refused, the lawyer
would still not be required to withdraw because the
representation is not a violation of law. Indeed, this was
the very problem at the heart of the SEC's administrative
action in In re Carterand Johnson that sought to hold the
lawyers responsible when they knew of the corporate
client's misconduct and simply stood by and did nothing.
Model Rule 1.16(b)(2)-(3) permits, but does not require,
an attorney to withdraw from representation in the
following circumstances: "(2) the client persists in a course of
action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent"; and, "(3) the
client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud."
As with the mandatory withdrawal rule, the
circumstances that allow the attorney to terminate

83. The commentary to Rule 1.16 states, "A lawyer ordinarily must decline or
withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in
conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.16, cmt. 2 (1983).
The Rule prohibits
continued representation only when the client demands that the lawyer "engage
in conduct that is illegal" but not when the lawyer could prevent the client from
continuing a course of conduct that is illegal by withdrawing from the
representation. In fact, Model Rule 1.16 says nothing about the propriety of
continued representation in the more common situation in which the lawyer
discovers client misconduct and the client refuses to rectify the situation or
permit the lawyer to report the violation.
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representation require that the attorney have been involved
in the client's misconduct by providing legal representation.
The SEC's up-the-ladder rule imposes a broad reporting
duty within the firm, triggered by the attorney's awareness
of "evidence of a material violation" but without regard to
the lawyer's involvement in the transaction or misconduct.
By dropping mandatory withdrawal from its final rule,
however, the Commission ensured that corporate counsel
can, and usually will, do nothing more than report evidence
of the material violation and then leave the matter to the
client on what step, if any, to take next. Model Rule 1.16
gives only a narrow ground for withdrawal, even in the
permissive context, and the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement does little more than reflect the Model Rules.
The rules adopted in response to § 307 are hardly a major
step forward, and certainly do not address the requirement
that the Commission adopt real minimum standards of
professional conduct for corporate counsel.
IV.

MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL

Would a mandatory lawyer withdrawal rule mean that
corporations could not engage in serious misconduct in the
future? The answer, of course, is no, because attorneys are
not necessary to the commission of many types of corporate
crimes. What the attorneys can provide is the patina of
legality to transactions, and many companies defend their
conduct by asserting that their counsel reviewed and
approved a transaction or course of conduct. One of the
more notorious examples of this occurred when Enron used
its usual outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, to investigate
the then-anonymous complaint sent by Sherron Watkins, a
mid-level executive, to Kenneth Lay, Enron's CEO, that
raised substantial questions about the company's use of
various financial vehicles and off-book transactions. 4 The
law firm gave the company a "clean bill of health" on the
84. Anonymous Letter to Kenneth Lay, August 2001, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
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issues raised by Ms. Watkins despite the limitations Enron
placed on Vinson & Elkins's ability to conduct a real
investigation of the allegations and the firm's own possible
conflicts from their prior involvement in the transactions.85
The danger is that attorneys will turn a blind eye to what
their clients are doing, and acquiesce in transactions or
conduct that, step by step, takes the corporation across the
line into illegality. Without a mandatory withdrawal rule,
corporate counsel can delude themselves into the belief
that as long as they do not directly participate in
misconduct and, if it were ever discovered, make the
necessary up-the-ladder report, they have fulfilled their
duty and can comfortably defer to the choices made by the
managers of the enterprise while continuing to represent
the company.
A mandatory complete withdrawal rule puts teeth into
the reporting requirement imposed by § 307 by requiring
lawyers to monitor the company's response to the report
and to measure whether the material violation has been
addressed adequately. Lawyers will have to ask whether
they can put themselves at risk of violating the rule by
continuing to represent the corporate client. The power of
the rule is the financial penalty it can impose on both the
lawyer and the client by mandating withdrawal. Adopting
85. See Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 29, at 209 ("Vinson should not
have accepted this assignment. To say that the matters raised by Watkins were
serious problems that warranted a full-fledged, all-out, independent investigation
of potential wrongdoing related to Enron's financial shenanigans would have
required it to criticize its own previous advice to the company and to open itself
up to lawsuits and further scrutiny. The idea is ridiculous that an investigation
conducted by Vinson, under these circumstances, would count to establish that
Enron's management had fulfilled its fiduciary duty to investigate allegations of
wrongdoing by the company and its agents made by a credible employee.");
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1201 ("although lawyers may take on an assignment
that limits the scope of their representation or asks them to accept some facts as
given, they may not agree to such limits as will preclude them from competent
and ethical representation."); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate
Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ehtical Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143, 164 (2002)
("The investigation required V&E to assess objectively, as if it had not been there
at all, the soundness and propriety of its prior representation. Thus, the situation
presented a serious conflict between Enron's presumed interest in an objective
investigation and V&E's own interests.").
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a mandatory withdrawal requirement would give lawyers a
measure of leverage over their corporate clients if the
response to the report of a material violation were
insufficient. Moreover, if withdrawal proves to be required,
the next lawyer will be alerted because the rule requires
the company CLO to disclose prior counsel's reason was
due to "professional considerations." This is a strong signal
to the new lawyer to tread carefully and assess whether it
is in that lawyer's best interest to undertake the
representation.86 In addition, if the new lawyer agrees to
represent the corporate client, the new lawyer will have
leverage to demand an acceptable response to the conduct
that triggered the withdrawal by the first attorney as a
condition of representation."
While lawyers argued that the reporting requirement of
the proposed rule infringed on their independence from
outside interference in advising their clients, that
independence also requires that corporate counsel be willing
to stand up to the client by ceasing representation if the
corporation's officers and directors refuse to respond
appropriately in the manner the lawyers consider necessary
to comply with the law. 8 Imposing a mandatory complete
86. Mandatory complete withdrawal may also signal opposing lawyers to
problems at the corporation if a law firm resigns from all representations of the
company. This signal would be fairly weak, however, because even a statement
by the company's counsel that the withdrawal is due to "professional
considerations" would not indicate the particular matter involved. Nevertheless,
it would alert others outside the corporation that there may be a significant issue
related to corporate representation.
87. If a corporation refuses to make the requisite disclosure to its new counsel
of the reasons for the prior attorney's withdrawal, and if it asserts its attorneyclient privilege to prevent the first lawyer from discussing the reasons for the
withdrawal with the new attorney, then the second lawyer should not be
permitted to represent the company. The SEC's rule should address this
situation directly to make it clear that successor counsel has an independent duty
to investigate when it is retained due to a withdrawal under the rule.
Corporations should not be permitted to take advantage of the mandatory
withdrawal rule to rid itself of its first counsel and then keep the next lawyer
ignorant. Such a course of conduct is the very type of situation § 307 is designed
to combat by making the lawyers responsible for preventing a continuing course
of misconduct by the corporation.
88. See Griffith, supra note 53, at 1231 ("a lawyer's professional judgment
must be exercised independently of her clients. Lawyers must be independent of
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withdrawal requirement can give corporate counsel some
measure of power, at the risk of the having sanctions
imposed on them by the SEC for not taking the necessary
action, to ensure that corporate misconduct stops, or only
continues at the price of not having legal counsel available to
make it more difficult to detect and identify. 9
This approach does effect a change in the lawyer-client
relationship by introducing a potential conflict between
them, but the demand for independent, honest legal advice
to corporate clients should be backed up by the hazard of
withdrawal to ensure that companies do not continue down
a path of criminality. Chief Justice Veasey of the Delaware
Supreme Court urged corporate counsel to take their
position as independent legal advisors seriously, urging
that lawyers for corporations
should not fear the responsibility to "just say no" to a board
or management bent on a questionable or potentially reckless
course of conduct. Just saying "no" poses great risks for the
lawyer, particularly in terms of retaining a paying client, but
that is one of the risks a professional must take.9"

their clients in order to act as counselors, neutrally evaluating client positions
and informing them of the legal repercussions of their actions.").
89. This approach conflicts with the view of lawyers as acting solely on behalf
of clients, and that the clients' wishes must always control unless they are illegal.
See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the
Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and "Lying With an Explanation," 44
So. Tex. L. Rev. 53, 56 (2002) ("In the end, however, if both the objectives and the
means are within the boundaries set by the law, and the moral dialogue has been
a genuine one, not a paternalistic attempt by the lawyer to impose a personal
moral judgment, then the client's decision will control-if for no other reason than
that it is easier for a client to dismiss a lawyer than for a lawyer to 'fire a client'
by withdrawing."). Professor Painter, on the other hand, argues that "lawyers
cannot categorically deny moral responsibility for conduct of their clients."
Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 So. Cal. L. Rev. 507, 578 (1994). The mandatory withdrawal rule
should ease the problem for lawyers concerned that they would be imposing their
own views on their client by taking the decision whether to "fire" the client out of
their hands.
90. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and
the Professional Responsibilities of Lawyers, 28 J. Corp. L. 441, 451 (2003)
(emphasis added).
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A. The Race-to-the-Bottom Arguments
The reaction of the organized bar to the mandatory
withdrawal aspect of the noisy withdrawal rule was almost
uniformly negative, 9' and the reasons break down largely
into two categories. The first type of criticism, which I call
the "race-to-the-bottom" arguments, essentially claim that
the rule would discourage corporations from seeking good,
conservative legal advice because they would not want to
deal with the consequences of withdrawal if counsel's
advice were not followed. Therefore, according to this
position, companies will look for lawyers with lower
standards so that there is no risk of withdrawal.
The American College of Trial Lawyers asserted that
"requiring withdrawal and notification will effectively
discourage issuers from retaining counsel who are
conservative in the advice they render.... [A]n issuer will
be tempted either not to consult outside counsel or to select
counsel thought less likely to give cautious advice-and, in
either case, to disclose to counsel fewer potentially
troublesome facts."92 Jones Day argued that the "attorney
cannot guarantee the conduct of a client. We believe,
however, clients are far more likely to comply with the law

91. The Law Society of England and Wales pointed out that the mandatory
withdrawal rule and the reporting requirement were consistent with the rules of
the Law Society for English Solicitors, stating:
We have no objection to the proposal that an English solicitor should
withdraw from representing an issuer that has committed a violation
under SEC rules and failed to respond appropriately when this has been
drawn to its attention. As we set out in our previous response, the Law
Society's rules of professional conduct would require an English Solicitor to
withdraw if he believed his client was in danger of committing an illegal
course of action and if he had failed to prevent his client from doing so.
There is nothing in our rules or in statutory provisions governing lawyers
in England and Wales that would create difficulties if an issuer were
required to notify the SEC that their lawyer had withdrawn.
Letter from the Law Society of England and Wales, April 7, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lawsociety04O703.htm
(emphasis
added).
92. Letter from the American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 66.
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when properly counseled by attorneys they trust and with
whom they share all relevant information." 3
The argument against mandatory withdrawal on this
count assumes that corporations always, or at least
routinely, take the most aggressive approach possible and
that the only thing standing between the company and
rampant unlawfulness is the lawyer. That is inconsistent,
however, with how most cases of corporate misconduct
arise. It is not one decision or transaction that crosses the
line into illegality; it is more likely to be a course of conduct
that eventually takes the company into illegality.
Moreover, as seen in the recent cases of corporate
misconduct, the individual events leading to the ultimate
violation may be arguably legal, up to a point and when
viewed in isolation, and the violations accumulate over a
period of time as the company makes improper accounting
entries and misleading disclosures over a number of
months or years.
If a corporation's officers are determined to pursue a
course of conduct that is clearly illegal, then they will not
consult with any lawyer except one willing to join the
misconduct, and will seek to hide the violations from all
outside professionals who are not part of the scheme. If
managers are intent on violating the law, then no rule
imposed by the SEC will prevent that from happening. The
mandatory withdrawal rule does not come into play at the
outset, when the company enters into a transaction or
makes a decision, but after the discovery of wrongdoing by
the lawyer. When the report of that misconduct is made to
the board or the CLO, and the company's response is to
reject the advice of the lawyer on how to proceed, only then
does mandatory withdrawal become an issue. Requiring
the lawyer to withdraw at that point, and mandating that
the company provide successor counsel with the reasons for
that withdrawal, is a means to ensure that corporations
respond appropriately to serious misconduct, i.e., "evidence
of a material violation." What the mandatory withdrawal
93. Letter from Jones Day, supra note 52.
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rule does is make it harder for managers to continue
misconduct by alerting them to the possibility that a choice
to ignore corporate counsel will strip the company of any
legal counsel because the successor counsel may be
unwilling to undertake representation. The rule also takes
the first corporate counsel out of the pattern of
misconduct.94
A corollary to the independence argument against
mandatory withdrawal is the assertion that clients should
have the right to choose their counsel, especially if that
counsel is urging compliance with the law.95 The problem
with this argument is that the client may wish to retain the
attorney to prevent any further reports of wrongdoing and
94. A company could take a preemptive approach by firing counsel who makes
the up-the-ladder report to avoid the withdrawal and related reporting
requirement to new counsel. See Cane & Kelleher, supra note 48, at 611 ("there
is no provision [in the Noisy Withdrawal Rule] that prevents an issuer from
discharging the attorney before he can withdraw, thereby avoiding the
responsibility of disclosure."). The first lawyer could still withdraw from the
representation by formally notifying the company of his view that termination is
an inappropriate response, thereby signaling the new lawyer as to the potential
problem. Moreover, new counsel should contact the prior attorney to discuss the
status of the matter, and that can be a means to raise the issues regarding the
up-the-ladder report. That said, to the extent a corporation wanted to hide its
misconduct from counsel, it may be successful and the mandatory withdrawal
rule will not ensure that lawyers will prevent a continuing course of misconduct.
Of course, that is the flaw with every rule which can be ignored by a miscreant
bent on violating the law.
95. See Letter from the American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 66
("Surely, continued representation up to that point [when the lawyer would be
required to withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(a)(1)] ought to be preferable in the
Commission's eyes to depriving the client of counsel who urges compliance with
the law."); Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 53 ("If a client, even after the
difficult stresses occasioned by a withdrawal, still wishes to retain the
withdrawing lawyer or law firm, then we believe that option should be
available."). This point was reiterated more recently by M. Peter Moser, an
attorney with Piper Rudnick, at a hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises at a hearing
on February 4, 2004, entitled "The Role of Attorneys I Corporate Governance."
Mr. Moser stated, "Mandatinglawyer withdrawal at all would deny lawyers the
flexibility they need to counsel clients effectively on compliance with complex
securities laws" (emphasis in original). Letter from M. Peter Moser to Hon.
Michael G. Oxley and Richard Baker, Feb. 3, 2004, available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/020404pr.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
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to contain information about allegations of misconduct from
being passed on to new counsel, who may demand the same
response as the first lawyer. The company ignores its
counsel's advice, so it hardly seems effective to permit the
corporation to continue to use that lawyer's services. The
idea behind mandatory withdrawal is that the client has
triggered the outcome by refusing to comply with the
lawyer's advice on how the company should act, so the
argument that the rule somehow deprives a corporate
client of its right to choose its lawyer is nonsensical when it
is the client that essentially puts the lawyer in the position
of having to withdraw.
Along the same line, it is the required disclosure to
successor counsel of the reasons for prior counsel's
withdrawal that makes the rule effective because it forces
the corporation to justify its reasons for rejecting the advice
of its first lawyer. When the company discloses why its
prior counsel had to withdraw from representation, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to hire new counsel without
an acceptable explanation for its conduct and the reason for
the disagreement with the first lawyer. There is a danger
at this point that the corporation will seek out less
conservative counsel and "buy" an opinion from the
successor counsel that the company's conduct did not
amount to a "material violation." That danger is inherent
in the system, however, and the fact that a corporation may
be able to entice new counsel into abiding by the company's
view of its conduct does not mean that the mandatory
withdrawal rule is flawed.
The rule counts on the new lawyer retained after the
first lawyer's mandatory withdrawal to review the reasons
for the withdrawal and to provide independent legal advice
rather than simply being bought to render the opinion the
company wants. The danger of companies shopping for the
most favorable legal advice is always present, and the
mandatory withdrawal rule does not exacerbate that
problem. More importantly, the new lawyer, in the face of
the prior withdrawal, will be on notice that the decision to
represent the company after the prior mandatory
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withdrawal-triggered by the corporate client's refusal to
accept that attorney's legal advice-is likely to be
scrutinized closely if there is an SEC investigation or
private lawsuit raising questions about the transactions or
conduct that caused the mandatory withdrawal. While the
corporation's attorney-client privilege will shield the legal
advice given by both attorneys, at least initially, there is a
risk that the second counsel could be found to have given
faulty legal advice or even aided and abetted a securities
law violation by the corporation, subjecting the second
lawyer to a possible malpractice claim or securities fraud
enforcement action.
Outside professionals have a reputation to maintain,
and the incentive to act in accordance with the law justifies
relying on attorneys asked to serve as successor counsel to
ensure that the company acted properly in both its conduct
and its response to the report of a "material violation" by
the first lawyer. Although a possibility, it seems unlikely
that a law firm would advertise itself to companies as the
counsel that will say only what the corporation wants to
hear, available to sell compliant legal opinions at
www.noquestionsasked.com.
Another
race-to-the-bottom
argument
is
that
mandatory withdrawal, especially if the law firm must
withdraw from all representation of the issuer, will
discourage reporting of a material violation to the senior
management
because
of
the
"drastic
economic
consequences that might flow from such advice."" The
point is a valid one, but the same is true of the conflict of
interest rules and the prohibition on assisting a client in
criminal or fraudulent conduct. Any rule that prohibits or
limits the ability of a lawyer to represent a client has an
economic effect. The lawyer may not want to trigger the
up-the-ladder reporting requirement because it is
uncomfortable to raise serious questions about the
decisions or conduct of corporate managers, the people
lawyers interact with on a daily basis, and may result in
96. Letter from the American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 66.
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the corporate client firing the lawyer. The mandatory
withdrawal rule does not require that the lawyer cease
representing the corporate client upon learning of the
misconduct; that would be draconian and make it highly
unlikely there would ever be such a report. Instead, the
rule requires the lawyer to determine whether the
corporation's response after the report will mitigate
successfully the material violation, a later point at which
the position of the parties will be much clearer and the
facts will be available to evaluate the propriety of
management's response to the report.
If management fails to respond in a way that satisfies
the lawyer, then the lawyer will have to pay a price by
withdrawing from representation. That withdrawal should
be from all representation, to the extent practicable under
limitations on withdrawal imposed by the courts or other
adjudicatory body, 97 because the lawyer-client relationship
is fundamentally tainted by the corporation's refusal to act
appropriately, at least in the lawyer's eyes. That lawyer
(and law firm) should not provide legal representation to
the corporate client if that client will not comply with the
law.98 Law firms and in-house attorneys need to have
97. For example, withdrawal in pending litigation usually requires leave of
the court. If a case was in trial-or sufficiently close to trial-so that withdrawal
would cause unnecessary delay, counsel would be able to continue the
representation at the direction of the court.
98. One objection to the mandatory withdrawal rule was its failure to limit
withdrawal to the representation that triggered the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement to which the company did not respond appropriately. The problem
with permitting a limited withdrawal would be identifying the matter that
triggered the rule. While a law firm may represent a corporation in a number of
different forums, the firm's representation in the corporate and securities area
does not necessarily permit easy distinctions between different matters. For
example, is representation on the issuance of a security distinct from
representation on a corporate transaction in which there is a substantial conflict
of interest that corporate counsel does not believe has been vetted sufficiently or
that is harming the corporation? The matter may have to be disclosed in the
securities offering, so the representation would have to be terminated outside just
the limited transaction or litigation in which the "material violation" arose. See
Cane & Kelleher, supra note 48, at 610 ("Due to the complexity and breadth of
securities law, however, any matter related to the issuer may be related to a
material violation; separating matters when an attorney may still participate will
be extremely difficult."). The benefit of the rule is the simplicity of its approach,
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sufficient credibility with the client to convince it to act
appropriately in response to "evidence of a material
violation." If they do not, then the goal of § 307 to prevent
corporate crime is better served by having corporate
counsel withdraw from all representation.9 9
Along the same lines, the mandatory withdrawal rule
imposes a potentially significant cost on the client because
new counsel may be necessary for both the issues related to
the material violation and other representations by the
former law firm. The cost, however, is a result of the
corporation's choice to reject the legal advice of the first
corporate counsel that triggered the withdrawal. 10 0
B. The Race-to-the-Top Arguments
The second category, which I call the "race-to-the-top"
arguments, rests on the assertion that the mandatory
withdrawal rule gives the lawyer too much authority to
enforce a particular view of the proper response to conduct
that the corporation may not view as a "material violation"
or that the violation that does not require the response the
attorney seeks.
This is a type of client autonomy
argument-that the lawyer is only responsible for
recommending a course of action to the client and, should
the client choose to ignore that advice, then the lawyer
must yield to the client's wishes.
The lawyer could
withdraw in this situation under ABA Model Rule
1.16(b)(4), which allows an attorney to cease representing a
client if "the client insists upon taking action that the

that once the relationship has deteriorated to the point that the corporation will
not respond appropriately to counsel's legal advice, that should be the end of the
lawyer-client relationship.
99. It is difficult to envision a corporation rejecting legal advice in one area
while trusting the same lawyers in another situation, although in a large
organization it may be possible to segregate the views of the corporate managers
and maintain an attorney-client relationship.
100. See Cane & Kelleher, supra note 48, at 610 ("disclosure of the partial
withdrawal of an attorney may mask significant violations by an issuer.
Therefore, if an attorney is in a situation where he must withdraw, such
withdrawal must be complete.").
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lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
This is a permissive
fundamental disagreement."
withdrawal, and the lawyer may choose to continue
representing the client despite the "fundamental
disagreement."
The American Corporate Counsel Association asserted
that "[w]e do not support promulgating professional rules
making lawyers responsible (and liable) for coercing clients
The Federal Regulation
to accept legal advice. ' 0 '
Committee of the Securities Industry Association asked,
"Why should a lawyer, operating from a perspective that
may be narrower and less fully-informed than that of an
independent audit committee or board of directors, be
expected to decide whether the audit committee or board's
exercise of its business judgment was correct, or whether
some other steps were necessary to make the action
0 2
'appropriate'?"'
The Business Roundtable asserted that
companies faced with the threat of withdrawal (and
subsequent public disclosure) could effectively be compelled
to acquiesce to their attorney's position-even if the board of
directors disagrees in good faith with that position. In this
regard, the alternative proposal [to have the corporation
disclose the attorney's withdrawal] would replace the
judgment of the board with the judgment of a single
attorney. 10 3

101. Letter from the American Corporate Counsel Association, supra note 67.
102. Letter from the Federal Regulation Committee of the Securities
at
April
7,
2003,
available
Industry
Association,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/frcsiaO4O7O3.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
103. Letter from The Business Roundtable, April 8, 2003, available at
(last visited Nov. 5,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/brt040803.htm
2004). The American Bar Association made the same point with regard to any
disclosure of the attorney's withdrawal, stating that "[als long as the matter has
reached the proper level in the corporate governance structure through up the
ladder reporting, the company, and not its attorney, should be entitled to make
the disclosure decisions." Letter from the American Bar Association, April 2,
2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/aba040203.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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This argument against mandatory withdrawal is the
very problem the rule seeks to address. Lawyers have
stood by while corporate clients continue to act or engage in
transactions that the lawyer considers improper and even
illegal. Section 307 requires the SEC to adopt "minimum
standards of professional conduct" to change the culture of
corporate representation so that lawyers will not accept the
client's decision as final, or accede to a client's demands
that a course of conduct continue despite the lawyer's
objections. Once again, this was the very problem the
Commission tried to punish in National Student Marketing
and In re Carterand Johnson, that corporate counsel could
not just stand silent when the client insisted on acting in
violation of the federal securities laws.
The assertion that the client ultimately should decide
whether and how to respond to a report of wrongdoing
ignores the ways in which a corporation's culture can foster
a mindset that can view any assertion of wrongdoing by
corporate managers as a threat to the company that must
be resisted at all costs. Professor Fanto has applied the
social psychological theory of "groupthink" to argue that
the senior management may resist efforts to correct or
prevent wrongdoing by the corporation because "group
members become uniform in their views and see only the
positive, not the negative, about group attitudes and
behavior."
As a result, the group "will collectively
discipline any member who fails to stand uniformly behind
the group's perspective and are dismissive, even
contemptuous, of those outside the group and of views
other than their own."1 0 4 Lawyers are not immune to being
co-opted into a corporate culture that will not permit any
claim of wrongdoing. Professor Langevoort notes that
"lawyers are particularly prone to blind spots regarding
their clients .... Their commitment is clear and public,
and they are called upon frequently to articulate the
104. James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering
Corporate Inner Circles 23 (Nov. 20, 2003) (unpublished paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=471261 (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
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client's position-something that polarizes attitudes and
10 5
beliefs, for the act of saying often strengthens belief."
Professors Rhode and Paton viewed the conduct of the
lawyers who advised Enron through the lens of cognitive
psychology,
concluding
that
"lawyers will
often
unconsciously dismiss or discount evidence of misconduct
and its impact on third parties ....The more that counsel
blends into the culture of corporate insiders, the greater
the pressures of cohesiveness."106
The mandatory withdrawal rule is a small step toward
empowering lawyers to stop, or at least impede, corporate
wrongdoing by putting in place at least a small
counterbalance to the inevitable pressure to fulfill the
corporate client's wishes.10 7 The rule is designed to give
them a measure of power that they might not otherwise
have by making the corporation's decision to resist the
lawyer's advice on how to respond to a "material violation"
a costly one.108 Without mandatory withdrawal, lawyers
may not have the authority to resist the decision-making
power of corporate management to continue acting
illegally.10 9 As the rule is currently written without the
105. Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry
into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand.. L. Rev. 75, 104 (1993).
106. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 Stan.
J.L. Bus. & Fin. 9, 32 (2002).
107. See id. ("Rules requiring corporate lawyers to report corporate fraud can
provide much needed support for those who would otherwise face enormous
pressure to remain team players.").
108. See DongJu Song, Note, The Laws of Securities Lawyering After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 Duke L.J. 257, 287-88 (2003) ("To be sure, the sudden
rebalancing of power between the lawyer and client may seriously disrupt their
relationship, but Sarbanes-Oxley is here to stay, and managers are going to need
lawyers at least as much as before the Act was passed. With their continued
participation assured, the greater power of lawyers may effectively lead to
precisely the desired result: increased compliance with the securities laws.").
109. Without some external impetus to resist client wrongdoing about which
the lawyer is aware, the lawyer may end up becoming a participant. See Richard
W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment,
84 Minn. L. Rev. 1399, 1422 (2000) ("Lawyers who never would have facilitated
the conduct that got their clients into trouble to begin with (and who even advised
against the illegal conduct), when deciding how to cut their losses, may help
conceal the client's violations and take other risks that a 'rational' lawyer would
not."). Although one would expect that the ethical provision in Model Rule 1.2
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mandatory withdrawal requirement, unless corporate
counsel's powers of persuasion are sufficient to sway a
client to act in the way the attorney considers proper, the
corporation can ignore the legal advice without any cost, at
least until the misconduct is exposed. 110 That is hardly an
effective measure to prevent corporate crime, at least as
envisioned by the proponents of § 307.
A related argument against mandatory withdrawal is
that an in-house attorney may use the rule to resist
disciplinary action by the corporate employer.
The
Association of Corporate Counsel, in testimony before a
House subcommittee, stated that since the adoption of the
up-the-ladder rule there has been "a marked increase in
the number of threatened lawyer whistleblower actions in
response to a negative performance review or a
disagreement with the CLO's more informed judgment
about the merits of an allegation brought forward by a
junior attorney.""'
The adoption of the mandatory
withdrawal rule would give an attorney in that situation
even greater power to assert the employer is acting
improperly, but the requirement of complete withdrawal
would also limit the rule's utility for in-house counsel as a
means to threaten the corporation. If an in-house lawyer
were to allege improperly that there is "evidence of a
material violation" and the corporation refuses to respond
appropriately, then the mandatory complete withdrawal
rule would require the person to resign from the
corporation.
It may be that the attorney would be
terminated anyway, but a complete withdrawal rule
prohibiting lawyers from counseling clients to engage in misconduct would be
sufficient, the mandatory withdrawal rule would give be an added measure to
ensure that the lawyer resist, rather than join, a corporate client's wrongdoing.
110. See Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 1303 ("The major
difference between current law and a noisy withdrawal obligation is that today an
attorney could arguably stand aside and not object when the issuer made a
disclosure violation of which the attorney was aware but did not actively assist.").
111. Statement of Linda Madrid on behalf of the Association of Corporate
Counsel before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government
Sponsored
Enterprises,
Feb.
4,
2004,
available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/0204041m.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
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imposes a cost on both the attorney and the corporation
that should limit improper use of the rule to advance the
personal interests of an attorney at the expense of the
corporate client.
This does raise a related concern about the effect of a
mandatory complete withdrawal rule on in-house counsel.
The Commission's "noisy withdrawal" rule treated "outside
attorneys" and "in-house attorneys" differently by
exempting an attorney employed by the corporation from
having to withdraw-which would effectively mean
resigning from employment-because such a requirement
"appears to be unreasonably harsh.""' 2 The SEC is right
that the effect of a mandatory withdrawal rule normally
would impose a greater hardship on the in-house lawyer
because that person does not have a diversified practice to
fall back on and therefore may be unwilling to bring the
material violation to the attention of management for fear
of the consequences of starting the up-the-ladder reporting
process. The bifurcated approach likely was a political
move by the SEC because the "noisy withdrawal" rule was
sure to be controversial and in-house lawyers would be
certain to oppose it-probably quite vehemently-if it
required them to resign in the face of an inappropriate
response to a report of a "material violation."
The Commission's distinction drawn between outside
counsel and in-house lawyers is not based on any analytical
difference between the different types of practice, but
rather one that appears to be based on human nature. The
ethics rules do not recognize any such distinction, and the
important rules on conflicts, candor, and withdrawal are
uniform across the profession. Moreover, the economic
effect of mandatory withdrawal will also be visited on
outside counsel, especially if a substantial portion of the
lawyer's or law firm's work is devoted to that corporate
client. The rule does not take account of lawyers in that
situation.

112. Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 7.
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For the rule to be effective, and to limit the possibility
that it may be used strategically by lawyers for personal
benefits, it must require complete withdrawal from
representation of the corporation. The cost will be high,
especially for the in-house lawyer and the law firm that
derive a substantial portion of their revenue from one
company. Moreover, the effect of the resignation of an inhouse lawyer may be much less than that of an outside law
firm because the company may be able to shift around
responsibilities for pending matters with ease. The rule
does require that the corporation inform any successor
counsel on the matter, whether in-house or an outside
lawyer, of the reasons for the mandatory withdrawal.
If the relationship reaches the point where the
corporation refuses the lawyer's considered legal advice in
how to respond to a "material violation," then is it
beneficial for that lawyer to continue representing such a
company? A rule that imposes little or no cost on the
attorney and the client naturally will appeal to both sides;
that is the current state of affairs with the up-the-ladder
reporting requirement as the only obligation for lawyers
who discover wrongdoing by the corporation. Section 307 is
a broader mandate to use lawyers to prevent future
corporate crime that requires rules that are costly to the
participants but will benefit investors and the public by
reducing the likelihood or extent of corporate misconduct.
CONCLUSION
"NOTHING IS EASIER THAN SELF-DECEIT. FOR WHAT EACH

MAN WISHES, THAT HE ALSO BELIEVES TO BE TRUE."113
I wonder whether the debate about "noisy withdrawal"
is much ado about nothing. Even if required, would
lawyers really make the disclosure such a rule mandates,
and would they push their position to the point where they
would have to withdraw from representing the corporation,
113. Demosthenes.
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especially a large client that pays its bills in a timely
fashion? Surely lawyers can hit upon a way to avoid
finding "evidence of a material violation," especially when
the SEC's definition of the phrase is so convoluted that it
will be nearly impossible to prove that an attorney
breached the standard.
The reaction of the bar to the "noisy withdrawal" rule
had overtones of the kind of self-deceit about the need for
changes that will occur in any group of professionals faced
with responding to demands for adjusting how they
practice their chosen profession. When the ABA considered
changing Model Rule 1.6 to permit-but not require-an
attorney to disclose a client's use of the attorney's services
to commit a fraud, a former president of the organization
attacked the change as an attempt "to barter away a piece
of our soul to gain public approval."'14 It is a little hard to
see how the very modest change in the rule would somehow
tear apart the legal profession or fundamentally alter the
lawyer-client relationship. The rhetoric of the slippery
slope or, even worse, the demand to mount the parapet to
resist the encroaching barbarians makes it easy to view the
reaction of the bar as self-serving." 5 Even more troubling
is that the ABA adopted the change to Model Rule 1.6 by a
vote of 218-201; a switch of only nine votes would have
reversed the outcome and squarely placed the ABA in the
role of obstructing change.
The rhetoric has succeeded, however, and the "noisy"
aspect of the rule appears dead in the face of the claimed
invasion of the attorney-client privilege and the sanctity of
the lawyer-client relationship. The "withdrawal" portion
has become entangled in the same wave of opposition and
may be equally moribund. It should not be cast adrift,

114. Model Rules: ABA Amends Ethics Rule on Confidentiality, Corporate
Clients, to Allow More Disclosures, ABA!BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct, Current Report, Aug. 12, 2003, available on Westlaw database 19 LMPC
467.
115. ABA President-elect Robert Grey, in opposing the change to Rule 1.6,
stated, "This is not the proper time to bow to threats by others who seek to
regulate us." Id.
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however, because the real benefit of mandatory complete
withdrawal is the leverage it gives to attorneys who will
not look for loopholes but will adhere to the rule. The
lawyers need the support of a rule that will help them to
change how a corporation acts when they discover a
"material violation" and, if necessary, withdraw from
representation when they cannot obtain the necessary
response from the corporate client. 116 The rule makes life
difficult for corporate counsel by requiring a measure of
honesty in reporting a violation up the ladder with full
knowledge of the consequences if the corporation refuses to
respond appropriately.
Mandatory complete withdrawal and the required
disclosure to successor counsel can make lawyers more
effective in preventing or impeding corporate crimes
because the rule makes it significantly more difficult for
the corporation to continue a course of conduct without
considering the consequences.
Much like the public
disclosure sought by the Commission, withdrawal is a
signal, only to a more limited audience: the corporation and
the new lawyer. The rule relies on that second attorney to
be as ethical as the first lawyer, and to refuse to accept the
corporate client if there is "evidence of a material violation"
and a refusal to act appropriately.
Mandatory withdrawal and disclosure to successor
counsel may cause corporate managers to avoid the
company's lawyer, or to withhold information about
possible misconduct, because the lawyer cannot be
controlled by the corporation due to the requirements of the
rule. Good! Lawyers generally do a fine job of advocating
on behalf of their corporate clients and explaining how the
law does not apply to them. It may be that such knowledge
and representation facilitates corporate misconduct by
making it more difficult to expose and easier to explain, at
least for a time. I suspect that if a mandatory complete
116. See Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 1296 ("imposing
gatekeeper obligations on attorneys is likely neither to chill socially desirable
client communications nor to reduce attorneys' influence over their clients, but
may actually increase attorneys' leverage over their most intransigent clients.").
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withdrawal rule causes managers to avoid consulting with
lawyers, then they will not do as good a job and either will
be caught sooner or will be less effective in their
misconduct. What better use for corporate counsel than to
encourage legal conduct and, when confronted with
evidence of misconduct, make the up-the-ladder report and
demand that the violation be corrected or prevented. If the
corporate client will not act appropriately, then the client
needs to be fired and, if necessary, forego the services of the
legal profession.

